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Answering the call for institutional specific research of diversification, this thesis 
explores the diversification antecedents and extents of Chinese firms during the 
economic transitions. I built the exploration upon the theoretical framework of 
institutional theory, which consists of institutional legitimacy pressures arguments and 
institutional capital arguments. 
The institutional pressures arguments emphasize on the influence of institutional 
environment on the strategic choices of firms. I specified this perspective as the 
influence of institutional pressures on the diversification antecedents of Chinese firms. 
Drawing upon the three pillars (Scott 1995) of legitimacy pressures, I analyzed the 
regulative, normative and cognitive pressures on Chinese firms, differentiating the 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non State-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). 
Combining the different characteristics of SOEs and non-SOEs, I then predicted that 
SOEs are likely to show a higher extent of diversification than non-SOEs. 
The institutional capital arguments emphasize on the heterogeneous capabilities 
of firms to respond to the institutional environment. I resorted to the concept of 
institutional relatedness by Peng et al. (2004) and broke down the institutional capital 
into three constructs: political capital, social capital and reputation capital. To specify 
this perspective, I first referred to the general finding in diversification research set in 
emerging economy that conglomerate shows good performance due to the 
 VI
institutional void common to these emerging economies. Then I reasoned from this 
finding that diversification is supposed to be a preferred choice for Chinese firms, but 
the implementation of diversification is constrained by the firm’s institutional capital. 
The greater the institutional capital of a certain firm, the more likely that is has a high 
level of diversification because it has the capability to take advantage of the 
institutional void. Building upon this proposition, I predicted that a firm’s stock of 
political capital, social capital and reputation capital are positively related to its 
diversification extent.  
To carry out the empirical tests, I compiled a cross-sectional time series 
composed of Chinese listed companies for a period from 1997 to 2001. I used the 
entropy measure to calculate the diversification extent and the information of equity 
share, ownership level and top 10 shareholders to calculate the explanatory variables. 
I used the MLE random effects models to carry out the empirical tests. The results 
provide support for most institutional capital related hypotheses, but show no support 
for the institutional pressures related hypothesis. Specifically, first, SOEs do not show 
greater diversification extent than non-SOEs. Second, firms with greater network 
diversity and reputation capital show a greater diversification extent. The network 
breadth shows different effects on the extent of related, unrelated and total 
diversification. Political capital measured as ownership level is insignificant, but 
political capital measured as aggregate equity share of stakeholders related to state 
shows a U-shape relationship with a firm’s total diversification.  
Combining the theoretical arguments and the empirical results, I then discussed 
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alternative explanations for those hypotheses not supported and further interpretation 
for those hypotheses well supported. Possible improvements on both theoretical and 
empirical aspects are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Diversification strategy has long been a major strategy for firms across the world. 
As a consequence, it is a leading topic for academic research in economics 
(Arnould 1969; Gort 1962; Lang & Stulz 1994), finance (Galai & Masulis 1976; 
Levy & Sarnat 1970) and strategy management (Christensen & Montgomery 1981; 
Markides & Williamson 1994; Rumelt 1974 1982). However, even with the long 
tradition of diversification implementation by managers and diversification 
research by academics, no conclusive results have been obtained in terms of the 
nature of the diversification antecedents and diversification performance 
relationship (Palich, Cardinal & Miller 2000). 
Key questions still remain to be answered. For example, why the 
diversification performance relationship has so many manifestations? What can 
explain the good performance of conglomerate in emerging economy but the 
refocusing behavior in developed economy? Is it only the economic rationale that 
accounts for a firm’s motivation to seek diversification strategy? If yes, does it 
hold when it comes to heterogeneous firms under different contexts? 
In approaching the research in this thesis, I will work with inquires such as the 
ones I have just identified and embed them into a study situated in a transitional 
economy setting. Diversification involves both antecedents and outcomes, and we 
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can study on the antecedents to improve our understanding of the outcomes, i.e. 
the inconclusive diversification performance relationship in the current literatures. 
In this thesis, I hence explore the diversification antecedents in the transition 
economy of China: what are the factors that help to explain the diversification 
extent of China’s firms (SOEs and non-SOEs) during the economic transitions?  
 
1.2 Contributions 
By making this form of inquiry, I can address three areas in which I can make 
contributions to existing research. These three areas roughly correspond to 
contributions to existing conceptual and theoretical work on diversification 
strategy, contributions in the form of the expansion of the empirical context for 
diversification and strategy research and contributions in the form of introduction 
of new theoretical groundings for exploring diversification strategy. 
Firstly, there has been the growth of an accepted belief that the institutional 
environment is very important in researching diversification strategy (Khanna & 
Rivkin 2001; Hoskisson Eden & Wright 2000; Kock & Guillen 2001; Peng 2002; 
Wan & Hoskisson 2003). Consequently, many studies have begun to compensate 
for the previous neglect of institutional environment in diversification strategy 
research. As examples of these, Mayer and Whittington (2003) carried out 
cross-national and cross-temporal tests to examine the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance. Singh et al. (2003) tested the diversification 
 3
performance relationship in East Asia. Both studies have the merits to incorporate 
institutional considerations to analyze the inconclusive issues of diversification 
performance relationship. 
Firms are embedded in the same institutional environment; nevertheless, they 
are heterogeneous in terms of the institutional pressures they are faced with. 
Furthermore, firms are not entirely passive to the institutional pressures from the 
institutional environment (Oliver 1991). However, no existent diversification 
study has made the efforts to integrate the above two arguments in one study. Take 
Mayer and Whittington (2003) and Singh et al. (2003) as examples, both allowed 
for the institutional idiosyncrasy in diversification study but they treated the 
institutional environment as exogenous to firm strategy and homogeneous to all 
firms. They simply focused on the moderating effect of broad institutional 
environment on diversification performance relationship thus neglected the firms’ 
response to the broad institutional environment. There are different strategy 
implications for different firms even in the same institutional situation. Deeper 
insights can be obtained by incorporating this firm heterogeneity within a general 
framework built upon institutional considerations (Fligstein 1980 1990 1991). 
Secondly, emerging economies have begun to attract greater attention from 
business researchers, who previously concentrated on developed economies 
(Khanna & Rivkin 2001). A prominent and leading transition economy is China 
(Peng 2000), which in 2003 is the world’s sixth-ranked economy by GDP growth 
(around 9%), and is poised to become the world’s 3rd economy by 2020. 
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Interestingly, although much research has been situated in emerging economies 
(e.g., Khanna & Rivkin 2001; Singh et al. 2003), only few studies in 
diversification strategy have considered the case of China (Li & Wong 2003; Li, 
Li & Tan 1998), which seems contradictory to the position of China’s economy in 
the world’s economy. I would like to explore the firm-level stories about 
individual firm growth through diversification because a direct study on 
organizational-level actions and the institutional environment that defines those 
actions can contribute greatly to our understanding of transitional economies 
(Guthrie 1997). In completing this study, I will try to understand if the existing 
findings on the firm strategy from research in developed and developing 
economies are applicable to the case of China’s firms, and if not, how they are 
different and why they are different. 
Generally, my research responds to the call for more empirical test on 
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000; White 2002). Specifically, the 
institutional situation of China not only shows a weak institutional environment 
such as inefficient capital, labor and product markets (Khanna & Palepu 1997), in 
a way similar to many other emerging economies (Singh et al. 2003), but it also 
represents a specific institutional context which is making a transition from a 
network-based economy to a market-based economy (Peng 2003) and from a 
central planning economy to a market-oriented economy. Both of these 
institutional idiosyncrasies transitions serve as a good experimental setting for an 
institution-oriented study. “Future studies employing larger samples that 
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empirically test firms’ diversification strategies will advance our understanding of 
why firms in transitional economies diversify” (Li et al. 1998: 92).  
Thirdly, the expansion of neo-institutional theory into strategic management 
research reveals the importance of institutional pressures for the formation and 
implementation of firm strategy (Ingram & Silverman 2002). Firms are pressured 
to be isomorphic by their external environments; and in response to these 
pressures, they will adjust their strategy and structure to align with the legitimacy 
requirements (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Scott 1995 2000; 
Oliver 1991).  
Despite the increasing acknowledgement of institutional pressures, little 
research has linked it with a firm’s diversification strategy. I contend that a firm 
can be pulled or pushed by the institutional pressures to diversify in ways that are 
different from those advanced by an economic efficiency rationale. Furthermore, 
institutional capabilities have the potential to influence the diversification decision 
under the pressures from the institutional environment. By applying these 
arguments to the context of China, which has distinctive political, institutional and 
cultural characteristics (Boisot & Child 1996), this study can help to extend our 
present understanding of diversification strategy beyond the efficiency arguments 
that underlie much of the research on diversification strategy, and beyond the 




Chapter 1 outlines this study with a general introduction to the research question, 
research setting and research purpose. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literatures 
on diversification strategy, institutional theory, and the transitional situation of 
China. Chapter 3 provides several propositions that capture some general features 
of firm strategy and the institutional environment in China. This chapter 
establishes the theoretical framework for hypotheses development in the 
following chapter. Chapter 4 presents this study’s hypotheses, which are 
concentrated on the antecedents and extents of firm diversification. These 
hypotheses are concerned with the influences of the economic transitions in the 
institutional environment in China, as well as the influences of the institutional 
capabilities on a firm’s diversification strategy decisions. In chapter 5, I discuss 
the dataset, the variable definitions and the statistical models for empirical tests. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the empirical tests. I conclude the study with 
Chapter 7 which provides a discussion of the results, the conclusions of this study, 
and some possible avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter I will review three sets of literatures. The first set is the 
diversification strategy literatures, focusing on the antecedents of a firm’s 
diversification decision. I will summarize the current research based in developed 
economies as well as in emerging economies. I will differentiate between related 
and unrelated diversification strategy in approaching the different antecedents that 
the literature has identified.  
The second set is the institutional theory literatures, which includes the 
interplay between the institutional environment and organization strategy, through 
reference to Scott’s (1995) three pillar arguments, and organization institutional 
capabilities arguments. I will identify the legitimacy forces on a firm’s strategy, 
here referring to diversification strategy, with the perspective of institutional 
considerations. 
The third part of the review concerns the institutional situation in China in the 
course of its economic transitions. I will establish avenues where the two streams 
of research (diversification literatures and institutional theory literatures) can be 
jointly applied for the study on the diversification strategy of China’s firms. 
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2.1 Review of Diversification 
Ever since Chandler’s (1962) seminal work on firm scope and scale which 
implicitly states that diversification leads to good firm performance, there has 
been a trend of increasing diversification-seeking endeavors by firms (Hoskisson 
& Hitt 1990). Though this trend has waned in some developed economies such as 
in the U.S. (e.g., Lichtenberg 1990; Markides 1990; Porter 1987), diversification 
still gains favor in many emerging economies, such as in East Asia (La Porta et al. 
1999; Backman 1999). In the meanwhile, research on diversification antecedents 
and performance is inconclusive. Although an inverted-U relationship between 
diversification and performance has been generally acknowledged as the basic 
pattern (Palich et al. 2000), modifications are still on-going (e.g. Mayer & 
Whittington 2003; Wan & Hoskisson 2003). One specific modification is made 
with reference to the context differences. Therefore, cross-sectional differences in 
terms of the institutional environments in developed economies and developing 
economies urge us to look further into the exact motivations for firm 
diversification under different contexts. 
 
2.1.1 Research on Diversification in Developed Economies 
Research on firm diversification has been undertaken for decades, with a 
dominant part of the empirical studies completed for firms that compete in 
developed economies. A developed economy is characterized by efficient markets 
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for product, capital and labor, as well as the efficient “invisible hand” guaranteed 
by a strong legal and regulatory environment. In this context, we would expect 
that firms seek diversification strategy mainly out of an economic efficiency 
rationale.  
Correspondingly, a considerable number of studies have been completed on 
the marginal economic benefits from related and unrelated diversification (e.g., 
Singh & Montgomery 1987; Lubatkin & Chatterjee 1994; Markides & Williamson 
1994; Palich et al. 2000). Studies on diversification antecedents have accordingly 
been mostly confined to the economic efficiency considerations. 
 As I want to study the antecedents of diversification strategy of China’s firms, 
this section will develop the literature review with reference to three points of 
departure from previous studies, as characterized above: (1) review the literatures 
on the different antecedents of diversification strategies; (2) study the moderating 
effect of the institutional environment on the diversification strategy decision; and 
(3) find the specific moderating effects that apply to China’s firms. 
 
2.1.1.1 Antecedents of Related Diversification 
Related diversification, or lateral diversification, often involves an element of 
commonality among the physical capital and technological skills of businesses or 
products (Teece 1982) involved in the diversification. Four reasons can be used to 
argue for related diversification. 
Reason 1: To increase market power. Diversification can provide tools to 
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exploit market advantages including predatory pricing and cross-subsidization to 
drive out rivals (Saloner 1987), and reciprocal buying and selling through vertical 
integration (Scherer 1980; Grant 1998).  
Reason 2: To use and create excess capacity. Firms are likely to possess 
excess resources including physical and human capital, some of which are 
common inputs to many products and businesses. However, due to the high 
transaction costs in a market and the tacit knowledge embodied in these forms of 
capital, hierarchical governance within a firm through diversification is more 
appropriate for their efficient use (Teece 1982). 
Reason 3: To reduce risk. This viewpoint is largely held by financial theorists, 
where portfolio diversification is vital to overall risk exposure (Markham 1973; 
Berger & Ofek 1995). In order to avoid the system risk within an industry, a firm 
can reduce risk by combining businesses whose cash flows are not perfectly 
correlated (Barney 1997; Grant 1998). 
Reason 4: To overcome market failure. Internal markets within a diversified 
firm cover the labor, capital and product markets. Compared with a 
single-business firm, a diversified firm is able to internally generate resources 
(Lang & Stulz 1994; Stulz 1990) and allocate it efficiently by a solo head office 
(Shleifier & Vishny 1991; Servaes 1996; Williamson 1986). For example, a firm 
is able to reap profits from its brand reputation among different products, 
customer loyalty and narrowly-focused technologies (Markides 1992). 
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2.1.1.2 Antecedents of Unrelated Diversification 
Unrelated diversification, or conglomerate diversification, involves the use of 
disparate physical capital and technical skills among products or businesses 
(Teece 1982), and each product or business requires its own core technology, 
market and management skills (Dundas & Richardson 1982).  
Reason 1: To divert from low performance. Losses can lead to changes. 
Troubled firms are more likely to take higher risks than high performing firms 
(Bowman 1982 1984), as underlined by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 
1979), the organizational learning literature (Cyert & March 1963) and population 
ecologists (Carrol & Delacroix 1982). Chang and Thoman (1989) found that low 
profitability led to further diversification, but returns did not necessarily increase.  
Reason 2: To defend future uncertainty. Diversification means a diversion of 
resource allocation of a firm, especially when it comes to unrelated diversification. 
With the rational to allocate resource more efficiently, firms in maturing industries, 
or structurally unattractive industries that are expecting decreasing margins and an 
increasing uncertainty of future cash flows (Leontiades 1986), must find new 
industries for long term competitive gains. Diversification into other businesses is 
regarded to be a rational reaction (Rumelt 1974) in this case. 
Reason 3: To build internal capital markets. The only linkage among the 
various products or businesses of unrelated diversification is the financial 
consideration (Dundas & Richardson 1982). Teece (1982) contended that firms 
with industrial experience were better able to assess investment opportunities than 
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banks or other investment institutions, because managers had superior access to 
inside information and a high control of investment, as the capital market within a 
firm can be more efficient than external capital markets (Williamsons 1975). 
Reason 4: Government Policy. Firms may diversify with the purpose to cater 
to, or avoid, government policy. Anti-trust policy and tax-laws are among the 
most relevant to the diversification decision (Scherer 1980). Antitrust constraints 
on horizontal mergers led to conglomerate diversification (Ravenscraft & Scherer 
1987), while relaxing takeover constraints led to focused firms (Lee & 
Cooperman 1989). High personal income tax encourages a shareholder to retain 
funds within the firm for further diversification (Jensen 1986), while high 
corporate taxation encourages more acquisitions (Auerbach & Reishus 1988). 
 In all, the abovementioned antecedents of diversification are mostly related 
to economic efficiency rationales, with a rare exception of the government policy. 
Firms in developed markets are able to seek these goals mainly based on market 
mechanisms because they are able to improve performance through diversification 
if they can realize the abovementioned benefits. As these benefits have been 
advanced in the context of developed economies, it is prudent to ask whether 
these antecedents and benefits also apply to firms in emerging economies. If not, 
what could be the specific motivations for diversification in an emerging economy, 
like a transition economy of China?  
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2.1.2 Research on Diversification in Emerging Economies 
Emerging economies are characterized by inefficient factor markets as well as 
inefficient market exchange mechanisms, or the so called “institutional void” (e.g. 
Li & Wong 2003). The institutional environment in emerging economy tends to be 
weak and an economic efficiency rationale is sometimes not the main concern of 
the firms. Consequently, there must be specific contingencies other than an 
economic rationale that affect firm strategies, but research in this regard has been 
limited. Most existing research tries to explain why the conglomerate form in 
emerging economies can perform well. Research does not look at the antecedents 
that are specific to firm diversification behavior in this type of institutional 
environment.  
One empirical study, for example, was done by Khanna and Palepu (1997).  
They linked the performance of the conglomerate form with the institutional 
context of an emerging economy—incomplete information in product markets and 
capital markets, the scarcity of well-trained professionals in the labor market, the 
extensive involvement of government regulations and inefficient contract 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Based on the data of seven emerging markets (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand), Lins and Servaes (2002) 
compared the values of diversified and focused firms within each country, 
contingent on the business group affiliation and ownership concentration. Their 
results showed that diversified firms were less profitable than single-business 
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firms in an emerging economy, especially when the diversified firms were 
affiliated to business groups. Hence, they did not find support for the argument 
that asymmetry information and imperfect markets in emerging economies could 
lead to better performance of diversified firms (Khanna & Ralepu 1997 2000). In 
other words, the implication of their findings is that the weak institutional 
environment may not lead the firms to diversify, at least from an economic 
efficiency rationale. 
With the objective of testing whether the institutional environment of a 
country affects the costs and benefits of diversification, Fauer et al. (2001) studied 
firms in 35 countries and found that diversification could be beneficial in an 
emerging economy, which they defined as low-income and low-GDP countries. 
On the contrary, Claessens et al. (1998) found that the benefits of both vertical 
integration and related diversification were positively related to per-capita GNP, 
using data from nine East Asian countries in the 1991-1996. 
The limited and mixed results from the above research on emerging 
economies leave us with the need to study diversification strategy further in 
emerging economies. One limitation of the above research is that researchers have 
not explicitly looked into the antecedents of diversification strategy, as related to 
the institutional idiosyncrasy of emerging economies. Although the theoretical 
explanations of diversification strategy based on economic scale and scope 
(Chandler 1962), management skills (Ohmae 1982), risk reduction (Chandler 
1962) and coordination costs (Jones & Hill 1988) are still applicable to firms in an 
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emerging economy, other factors, such as the exploitation of privileged access to 
information, government policies and regulations, licenses and markets, are likely 
to act as other important antecedents of firm diversification (Li et al. 1998; 
Backman 1999). Different antecedents can lead to different performance 
implications of a diversification strategy, so it is beneficial to explicitly look at the 
antecedents before drawing any conclusions about the diversification and 
performance relationship. In making this effort, I want to study the specific 
antecedents of the diversification decision as well as to add new insights to the 
inconclusive research on diversification performance relationship. 
The other limitation in literature is that although the above research does 
notice that institutional idiosyncrasies can increase the attractiveness of 
conglomerate diversification in emerging economies, it ignores the fact that not all 
firms can overcome the weak institutional environment and gain value through 
unrelated diversification. It is also possible that firms possess different capabilities 
to deal with the outside institutional environment, which may lead some firms to 
perform well with a diversification strategy, but others to not perform as well, 
given the implementation of a similar strategy. 
 
2.2 Review of Institutional Theory 
A firm is embedded in its institutional environment, as is its strategy.  
Accordingly, there has been a call for context-sensitive approach to strategy 
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research. “It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the effects of institutions on 
social structures and behaviors if all our cases are embedded in the same or very 
similar ones” (Scott 1995:146). As the most researched but inconclusive topic in 
strategic management literature (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt 1991), diversification 
strategy is one that requires context specification. The use of institutional theory 
can help to answer this call (Ingram & Silverman 2002). 
 
2.2.1 Institutional Legitimacy Pressures 
The main argument of institutional theory is that an organization selects the 
structure and strategies that are regarded to be legitimate according to specific 
institutional pressures. Three pillars of institutional environment have been 
proposed: regulative, normative and cognitive (Scott 1995; 2000). The Regulative 
Pillar (pressure) refers to informal mores and formal rules and laws that constrain 
and regularize organization behavior. The Normative Pillar (pressure) includes 
both social values and norms that impose constraints on social behavior. The 
Cognitive Pillar (pressure) refers to the established and shared conceptions and 
cognitive structures that are taken for granted, which constitute the nature of 
social reality and the meaning frame (Scott 2001).  
The three pillars exert their pressures from three levels—individual, firm and 
inter-firm level (Oliver 1997). At the individual level, the institutional pressures 
take effect through decision-makers’ norms and values; at the firm-level, 
organizational culture and politics are what the institutional pressures work on; at 
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the inter-firm level, the institutional pressures are manifested in public and 
regulatory pressures and industry-wide norms. 
 
2.2.2 Institutional Pressures and Organization Strategy 
The three pillars of institutional pressures, working through three levels, 
render the legitimacy that an organization should follow or seek. Legitimacy is 
typically defined as the generalized perception or assumption to evaluate whether 
an organization’s actions are desirable, appropriate or proper (Suchman 1995b). 
Firms, in response to the legitimacy requirement, will adjust organizational goals 
(Parsons 1960a), organizational structures and procedural aspects (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977) accordingly to establish conformity to institutional expectations. 
The fitness between firm structure and strategy with its environment is believed to 
be beneficial to a firm’s economic performance. If a firm shows a cognitively 
approved structure, activity or strategy, it receives support from normative bodies, 
and has approval from regulative authorities. It is thus more likely to survive and 
perform better than those without these profiles (Scott 2001). 
However, firms may seek legitimacy in two different manners. One is to 
proactively seek compatibility between institutional pressures and firm 
characteristics by carefully selecting the structures and processes that are believed 
to bring valuable outcomes. The other is simply to imitate other firms that are 
facing similar situations, without explicit consideration of economic efficiency or 
rationality. The first way is usually used in an environment familiar to the firm 
 18
while the second one is used when there is great uncertainty around a firm’s 
strategy. The uncertainty here refers to not only the uncertainty caused by 
cross-sectional or geographical variation, but also the one caused by temporal or 
dynamic variation. Obviously, the two different manners have different 
implications for a firm’s strategic choices. 
Although it is difficult to decide whether a firm chooses one strategy out of 
an economic rationale or mere imitation, researchers have found empirical support 
for the institutional effect on a firm’s practices and strategies. Mezias (1990) was 
among the earliest to empirically test institutional pressures. He compared applied 
economic models and an institutional model to empirically study the financial 
reporting practices of the Fortune 200. His findings revealed that institutional 
variables could add additional explanatory power, over and above the applied 
economic models. 
With a focus on the entry mode strategy of Japanese MNCs, Lu (2002) looked 
into the mode choice out of two considerations: transaction cost concerns and 
institutional pressures. Focusing on the inter-organizational imprinting effect 
(Berger & Luckmann 1967) and inter-organizational imitation behavior, i.e. 
frequency-based, trait-based and outcome-based imitation (Haunschild & Miner 
1997), Lu (2002) found that institutional isomorphism played a strong role in the 
entry mode decisions. Approaching a similar research question, Yiu and Makino 
(2002) tested the choice between JV and WOS of Japanese MNCs. They took the 
perspective of the institutional pressures by focusing on the three pillars argued by 
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Scott (1995) instead of the imitation pressure in Lu’s (2002) test. By translating 
the institutional pressure into the magnitude of its restriction on a firm’s entry 
mode choice, they found that all three pillars had additional explanatory power for 
the entry mode decision, though at different levels. They pointed out that 
regulative and cognitive pressures were more influential than normative pressures. 
As for the impact of institutional pressures and diversification strategy, 
limited studies have been done (Haveman 1993), although Fligstein and Dauber 
(1989) argued that efficiency-based explanations of diversification were not 
adequate and that institutional and political processes were worthwhile to be 
incorporated in strategy analysis. Fligstein (1991) studied the diversification 
patterns of large American corporations during the 20th century and found that the 
probability for a firm to diversify was positively related to the number of large 
firms that had adopted a diversification strategy. With a more specific concern of 
diversification strategy, i.e. the decision to enter a new market, Haveman (1993) 
investigated a population of savings and loan associations in California and found 
that firms were more likely to diversify into a new market if other large and 
profitable firms had diversified into that market, emphasizing the influence of 
institutional isomorphism in the course of firm diversification. Henisz and Delios 
(2001) looked into another dimension of diversification, i.e. the geographical 
diversification of Japanese MNCs. They controlled for the influence of political 
uncertainty and found that trait-based and frequency-based imitation did exist in 
the location decision of the geographical diversification strategy. 
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However, these few studies, though with an institutional perspective, are 
mainly confined to cognitive imitation, whether for the implementation of a new 
practice implementation, the new market diversification decision, or the location 
choice. No systematic efforts have been made to analyze the regulative and 
normative domains in diversification strategy, though “benefit from exploring the 
influence of the regulative and normative domains” (Henisz & Delios 2001: 469) 
are likely to be great. 
 
2.2.3 Institutional Capital and Organization Strategy 
Firms are not entirely at the mercy of the legitimacy pressures. Instead, firms 
are able to take advantage of their own capabilities to react to the environment in 
an active manner. Oliver (1991) explicitly proposed five strategies that a firm may 
take in response to its institutional pressures and expectations: acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Scott (2001) reviewed the 
causes of different responses to institutional pressures, including the varying 
institutional elements and mechanisms, i.e. regulative, normative and cognitive 
influences, the varying sources and salience, and the cross-geographical and 
cross-temporal variation.  
With a purpose to integrate transaction cost theory and institutional theory, 
Martinez and Dacin (1999) put forward four strategic responses to deal with the 
efficiency consideration and institutional pressures: isomorphism, ceremonial 
adoption, efficient imitation and efficient operation. In an attempt to extend the 
 21
internalization theory into the institutional argument, Henisz (2003) contended 
that a firm has two sets of specific assets to be internalized. One is the capability 
in terms of R&D, the advertising and so forth, and the other is the capability to 
deal with the institutional idiosyncrasy of different environments. In other words, 
a firm is able to accumulate the capability to respond to the institutional pressures 
instead of being entirely subject to those pressures. 
Peng et al. (2004) linked institutional theory explicitly with diversification 
strategy. They defined the concept of institutional relatedness as the informal 
linkages with dominant institutions in the institutional environment and contended 
that institutional relatedness could be a missing link in diversification research. 
They proposed three constructs—social capital, political capital and reputation 
capital—and claimed that the institutional relatedness could constitute a 
competitive advantage and contribute to the high performance of conglomerates in 
emerging economies. 
 
2.3 Review of Institutional Situation in China 
In this section, I will discuss the institutional changes that have occurred in the 
course of the economic reform of China. I will also describe the changes of formal 
and informal institutional changes that Chinese firms encountered during this 
period of transition, and differentiate firms into two broad types: SOEs and 
non-SOEs. SOEs here refer to the enterprises that are wholly owned by the 
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government or government agencies, the SOE-SOE joint operation enterprises, or 
the enterprises whose major shareholders (absolute or relative controlling 
shareholdings) are government or government agencies; non-SOEs include the 
private enterprises, privately-run enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and 
overseas-invested enterprises. I will introduce the reformation measures as they 
apply to these two types of firms. 
 
2.3.1 The Broad Institutional Environment Transition 
Ever since the launch of economic reforms in the late 1970s, China has 
experienced drastic institutional changes from economy to politics, from inland 
villages to coastal cities and from authority regulations to social belief. The 
readily observable manifestation of institutional changes due to the transition from 
a central planned economy towards a market-based economy is seen in the efforts 
to reform the broad institutional environment in order to establish the institutional 
foundations for a market-oriented economy. Accordingly, both formal and 
informal constraints are undergoing changes.  
In describing the institutional forces before and after the launch of the 
economic reform of China and East Europe, Peng and Heath (1996) pointed out 
that the formal institutional forces in planned economies were central planning 
and bureaucratic control. The formal institutional forces in the transition process 
to market economies were the lack of a property rights-based legal system, the 
lack of a strategic factor market and stable political structures. The informal 
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institutional forces in the transition were residual socialist values, collectivism and 
networks and personal exchanges. Drawing upon their analysis, I will try to break 
down the institutional changes that have occurred in the course of transition in 
China ever since the late 1970s. 
 
2.3.1.1 Change of formal constraints 
In this section, I will discuss changes in several formal constraints. These are 
the decentralization process, the pricing mechanism rearrangement, the strategic 
factor markets improvement and the legal system reformation. 
Decentralization: a dual decentralization process is ongoing; one is the 
authority decentralization from the central government to local governments 
(provincial and municipal level), and the other is from governments to individual 
economic entities. According to this intended process, a state’s assets should be 
privatized, state agencies should withdraw from direct interference with economic 
activity, and the role of government should be confined to providing neutral 
institutions for contract enforcement and property rights protections (Walder 
2002). 
Pricing System: prices of various products have been taken off the list of 
official prices set by the government and are allowed to fluctuate to reflect market 
demand and supply. Economic entities have the autonomous right to decide prices 
to a great extent according to the customer preference or demand constrain, rather 
than the resource constrain. Product variety is being encouraged and competition 
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is being increased among the economic entities. 
Financial market: in order to assist with the establishment of the Modern 
Enterprise System, various financial intermediaries have been founded in the last 
decades. The two stock exchange institutions in Shanghai and Shenzhen have 
witnessed increasing number of firms being publicly listed, which has helped to 
enhance the transparency of firm information, provide alternatives of financing 
resources other than bank loans. The stock market has put publicly listed firms 
into an equal competition platform and sets sample for other firms. Many 
professional institutional investors have emerged in the late years of the 1990s.  
Labor market: The markets for managers and employees are the main parts of 
labor market in the economy in China. Firms are encouraged to select employees 
and managers autonomously, and employees are encouraged to find a job by 
themselves. However, the increasing gap between labor supply and labor demand 
has been a challenge to the health of society. 
Legal system reformation: series of bills and regulations have been 
implemented, covering enterprise law (1988), bankruptcy law (1988), copyright 
law (1991), patent law (1993), corporation and company law (1994), insurance 
law (1995), investment law, and employment law (1995), guarantee law (1995), 
banking law (1995), bill law (1996), contract law (1999), securities law (1999), 




2.3.1.2 Change of informal constraints 
Unlike the formal constraints, informal constraints are more difficult to 
change but play an important role in regulating exchange behavior between 
individuals and firms during economy transition (North 1990). The widely used 
network relationship that was the main informal constraint before the transition 
has remained during the transition (Peng 1993 1994) due to three reasons. One is 
the lack of an adequate legal framework, such as the property rights protection. 
Firms without formal institutional protection have to resort to informal protection 
to some extent. The second is the unstable political structure and political hazards 
during transition that may cast doubt on official announcements (Peng & Heath 
1996). The third is the information asymmetry in various markets that induces 
firms to turn to personal relationship to obtain insider information. 
 
2.3.2 Institutional Pressures during the Transition 
The transition from a central planning economy to a market oriented economy 
revises the definition of legitimacy in terms of firm behaviors and firm goals. 
Under a central planning economy, the government plan tells the firms what to 
produce, how to produce and what they will receive from the production. The 
acceptance by government amounts to the legitimacy of a firm under a central 
planning system. However, under a market oriented economy, an individual firm 
should answer for its own performance. Firms have the autonomy to decide what 
products will be produced, where to buy the inputs and how much will be the 
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price they will set. The legitimacy seeking in a market economy is not driven by 
government plans, but by an economic efficiency rationale.  
During an economic transition period, when both government interference 
and market mechanisms are operative, the definition of legitimacy is rather 
illusive and complicated. Although fair competition in a market-based economy, 
the major theme of economic reform, has greatly impacted the business thoughts 
of the economic entities, not all firms would or could set market competition as 
the legitimate model of their operations. Top-down efforts to establish 
market-based economy are unable to cultivate market awareness for every 
individual and necessarily cause some chaos during the course of implementation. 
For example, the long history of relationship-based economic activity has erected 
resistance to pure market competition. Guanxi continues to be an important 
strategy for firms, especially for those small and private firms (Xin & Pearce 
1996). The government continues to play a role at all levels of enterprises 
managements but lacks the ability to carry out efficient supervision (Walder 
2002). 
Economic transitions also introduce different means to obtain legitimacy. As 
Peng (2003) proposed, the economic transition in China is a market-oriented 
institutional transition, inducing a change in transaction structure from relational 
contracting to arm’s length transactions. In response to this institutional change, 
an organization’s strategic choices are manifested in two broad divisions. One is a 
network-based strategy which focuses on the manager’s interpersonal 
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relationships with business partners and government officials and firms’ 
inter-organizational ties (Powell 1990). The second is a market-based strategy 
which emphasizes on competitive resources and organizational capabilities such 
as R&D and advertising.  
Building upon the three pillars of Scott (1995), Peng (2003) discussed three 
types of firms (incumbent firms, entrepreneurial start-ups and foreign firms) in 
terms of the different magnitudes of regulative, normative and cognitive pressures 
acting upon each type of firm. In the early stage of transition where many 
institutional foundations are being tried and revised, managers are faced with 
great uncertainty about the institutional constraints, so they are more likely to rely 
upon interpersonal relationships to seek organizational goals. In the later stages of 
transition, when the formal rules for exchange have been established and the 
complexity of exchange has been increased, the regulative, normative or cognitive 
pressures to build capabilities independent of networks have been strengthened, so 
managers begin to employ rule-based strategy to seek organization goal. 
 
2.3.3 SOEs in the Course of Transition 
Economic reform in China during the economic transition is dominated by the 
reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Here I will discuss the historical 
importance of SOEs in the economic growth of China, the SOEs’ responsibilities 
for social stability and the recent efforts that have been made to reform SOEs. 
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2.3.3.1 SOEs and economic growth 
As virtually the only organizational form in a central planning economy, 
SOEs played a dominant role in the economic growth of China before the 
economic reforms. They did this by producing almost all of the capital needed for 
elementary industrialization and the fiscal revenues. This story changed greatly 
after the economic reforms in 1978, with drastic decreases in SOE profitability. 
The percentage of SOEs in loss in 1978 was 23.9%, but it increased to 43.9% in 
1997. Their contribution to fiscal revenues decreased from 86.98% in 1978 to 
71.14% in 1997.  
Despite the decreasing economic importance of SOEs, their responsibility for 
the strategic growth of the entire economy has not decreased greatly. Heavy 
industries still have priority as granted by the government in terms of the capital, 
resources, foreign exchange and employees. Despite the scarcity of the above 
inputs for the heavy industries in the economy and the competitive disadvantages 
in these industries, SOEs are still required to concentrate on those industries.  
 
2.3.3.2 SOEs and social stability 
Aside from the strategic growth burden, SOEs of China also shoulder 
society-related duties such as employment and profit contributions to help 
maintain social stability. SOEs operate in a special institutional environment, 
where the authority structure is immensely influenced by the traditional Confusion 
legacy. Consequently, SOEs are not only a business entity, but also an overlapping 
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system of life and social-political function (Schermerhorn & Nyaw 1991). 
Shenkar (1996) even looked an SOE as a “total institution” which is a 
combination of life spheres where the production, housing, health care and a 
variety of daily functions are conducted under the same umbrella of one SOE.  
 
2.3.3.3 Relevant reform policies 
In terms of the SOEs, I divide their reform procedure into five phases and list 
the main regulations in each phase: 
1978-1982: temporary decentralization and interest concessions. Firms were 
granted some amount of autonomy and were allowed to retain parts of their 
profits. 
1983-1986: profit to tax; enlivening SOE. The boundary between firms and 
government was redefined in this phase. The purpose was to establish a fair 
platform for competition by imposing consistent taxes on every firm. 
1987-1992: intensify the decentralization and interest concessions and 
promote the contract responsibility system. Firms were required to pay promised 
taxes and profits, and to improve technology development while gaining the 
autonomy to run itself. Besides, the total available revenues a firm can obtain is 
based on its actual economic performance. 
1992-1997: experiment of Modern Enterprise System; manage large enterprises 
well while easing control over small ones; Strategic reorganization. The Modern 
Enterprise System has become the major theme of SOE reform since then. 
 30
1998-2000 Industrial SOE Reform Programs: the Modern Enterprise System, 
turning around large and medium industrial SOE; enlivening Small Industrial 
enterprise; and the dismissal of Industrial SOE Staff and workers. 
 
2.3.4 Non-SOEs in the Course of Transition 
Although an SOE is the main organization form in a central planning 
economy, many non-SOEs have emerged and been encouraged to grow during the 
transition process. Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs are actually a recent 
phenomenon in China’s economy. Generally, non-SOEs include the private 
enterprises, privately-run enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and 
overseas-invested enterprises. I exclude foreigner-invested enterprises and focus 
on the Chinese firms in this study. 
 
2.3.4.1 Non-SOEs and economic growth 
Non-SOEs began to prosper during the early decentralization and interest 
concessions period. The main characteristics of this group of firms are the clearly 
defined property rights, independent interests and autonomous operations, which 
grant them the capability to compete in a manner compatible with a market-driven 
economy. This advantage leads to a large contribution of non-SOEs to GDP of the 
entire economy in 1999, where the value was 71.79% of the total. In some eastern 
coastal provinces, this percentage has jumped above 80%.  
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2.3.4.2 Non-SOEs and social stability 
Compared with an SOE, a non-SOE is independent of administrative 
interference. On one hand, it is able to entirely decide the product to make, the 
price to charge, and the capital to accumulate; in other words, the requirement for 
a non-SOE to contribute to social stability is limited. On the other hand, due to a 
lack of adequate legal frameworks to protect non-SOEs, as well as the doubt of its 
legitimacy in a socialist country, a non-SOE has to secure its survival and 
legitimacy through various means such as interpersonal network building with 
government officials. 
 
2.3.4.3 Relevant policies 
As indeed the side product of economic reform, there are no equivalent 
reform policies or laws, such as those made for SOEs, that have been explicitly 
made for non-SOEs. Instead, the rapid development of non-SOEs has pushed the 
policy-maker to accept this new organizational form in China, and to regulate it 
correspondingly. There have been several stages in this process. 
1982: as early as in the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, there has been encouragement to build diverse sectors of economy, which 
began with the appearance of the non-SOEs.  
1997: in the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the 
non-SOEs sector of economy was formally proposed and acknowledged. 
1999: in the 9th National People's Congress, the statement that a non-SOE is a 
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basic component of the entire economy system was incorporated into the basic 
constitution of China. 
 
2.4 Summary 
Diversification has been intensively and extensively studied in the context of 
developed economies. However, the story is different in emerging economies, 
which are constrained by weak institutional environments or institutional void.  
Furthermore, due to the different institutional environments, diversifying 
firms in emerging economies are likely to be motivated by reasons different from 
those in a developed economy. The already studied antecedents in a developed 
economy setting for diversification include market power, risk reduction, excess 
resources and management skills, as originating from discussions about gains 
from the economies of scale and scope. Most of these motivations are driven by 
economic efficiency considerations from inside a focal diversifying firm, which is 
dominant in a market-driven economy. When it comes to an emerging economy, 
imperfect markets may lead to a comparatively high efficiency of internal markets. 
Severe information asymmetry result in high agency costs (Lins & Servaes 2002), 
and government intervention may lead to externally driven diversification. 
The transition economy of China possesses not only the characteristics of an 
emerging economy that are dissimilar to a developed economy, but also the 
features unique to transition economy itself, such as the legacy of a central 
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planning system, a variety of reform policies and the unbalanced industry 
structure. Unbalanced industry structure refers to the unbalanced development of 
different industries in the nation’s economy. Ever since the establishment of the 
PRC, the central government had disproportionably encouraged and supported 
certain industries such as the heavy machine industry, the chemical industry and 
neglected other industries such as the food industry.  
Specifically, firms in a transition economy are externally driven by a market 
mechanism to build competitive advantages and to become familiar with the rules 
of market competition. In the meanwhile, they are also regulated by government 
policies in terms of their strategic decisions. Consequently, firm strategy in a 
transition economy embodies not only the market pressures, but also the 
institutional pressure. All of these prove to make China a beneficial and 
interesting experimental setting for the study of diversification strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3 PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Firm Strategy in the Transition Economy of China 
Economic efficiency and institutional legitimacy pressures are two strands of 
constraints that are both important in determining firm strategy such as resource 
selection (Oliver 1997), growth patterns (Peng & Heath 1996; Peng 1997) and 
diversification strategy (Li, Li & Tan 1998; Peng et al. 2004). While economic 
efficiency is mainly manifested in the concern for competitive resource 
accumulation and transaction cost reductions, institutional legitimacy is mainly 
manifested in the concern for regulative acceptance, normative isomorphism and 
cognitive acknowledgement (Scott 1995). Acting upon firm strategy, the two 
strands of constraints can exert complementary but sometimes opposing 
influences. Consequently, the balance between the two strands of constraints 
defines an optimal but distinct strategy package for every firm. 
Unlike their counterparts in the developed economy where strong institutional 
environment provides an efficient platform for market competition in which 
economic efficiency is the main factor affecting firm strategy, the firms in a 
transition economy are constrained by the weak institutional environment. 
Institutional pressures can be more important than the economic efficiency for a 
firm’s strategy choice in transitional economies, especially in the transition from a 
central planning economy to a market-oriented economy. We can dig deeper into a 
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transition economy by differentiating firms that are owned by the state and those 
that are emerging as a new organizational form during the transition process. The 
former have lived through the central planning period as well as the ongoing 
transition period and are themselves the focus of market economy reforms. The 
latter were borne out of the promulgation of market-driven economic reforms and 
are less constrained by the formal reform policies.  
Under the context of market-oriented reform of China, SOEs have been 
encouraged to seek strategy choices autonomously through the privatization 
process and decreased central control. Non-SOEs have sprung out in response to 
the permission of reforms aimed at market competition. This constitutes a force 
pushing firms to seek efficiency out of an economic rationale. On the other hand, 
however, the pattern of gradual market reform of China introduces a market 
mechanism into the original rigid planned economy system in a very careful way, 
decentralizing some power to local agents while still leaving much other power 
intact in the hands of the government and regulatory agencies. Moreover, the long 
lasting Confucianism perspective has cultivated a culture where people are 
accustomed to a hierarchy of authority and tend to stick to the central planning 
legacy. Additionally, the lack of a formal institutional environment leads to an 
emphasis on informal institutions to deal with the uncertainty of reforms. The 
coexistence of central planning legacy, authority worship and the market-oriented 
reform pushes firms to seek institutional legitimacy defined by the economic 
transitions.  
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This corresponds to the institutional dependency by Child and Lu (1996), 
who defined it as the enterprise dependency upon external authorities. An 
enterprise is dependent on the external authorities in terms of the following facets: 
material dependence, such as for investment funding, operating resources, 
licenses and grants; relational dependence, i.e. the interpersonal relationship 
between managers and government officials; cultural dependence, like the shared 
sense of what is appropriate among managers and government officials. Because 
firms in the transition process are subject to the dependence upon the external 
institutional environment, they have to seek legitimacy from the institutional 
environment to obtain those resources which otherwise cannot be obtained simply 
through market competition as in the developed market economy. 
Proposition 1: Chinese firms are constrained by both economic efficiency and 
institutional legitimacy pressures. At the early stage of transition, institutional 
legitimacy pressure plays a larger role in firm strategy choice than at later stages 
of transition. 
 
3.2 Efficiency and Legitimacy Pressures on China’s Firms 
The institutional pressures on different firms are not the same. Even in the same 
economy within the same broad institutional environment, different firms are 
actually situated in different combinations of economic efficiency and legitimacy 
pressures. Specifically I will classify Chinese firms into SOEs and non-SOEs to 
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examine these different pressures. 
 
3.2.1 Efficiency and Legitimacy Pressures on SOEs 
Ever since the launch of the economic reform in 1978, SOEs have been the 
focus of almost all the economic reform policies. On one hand, they are prompted 
to account for their performance. Strict budget constraints have been gradually 
imposed on these firms. Managers of SOEs have been given more autonomy to 
make strategic choices based on economic efficiency consideration. At the same 
time, SOEs are still supposed to contribute to the satisfaction of social 
development goals. SOEs are expected to provide employment (Walder 1994), 
maintain low-cost or free social services, secure certain strategic products, and 
assume the responsibility to lead regional economies (Li, Li & Tan 1998).  
To allow for this expectation, the government still discriminates across firms 
and distributes resources to SOEs in a non-market manner. As Child and Lu (1996) 
stated, the previous arrangements deeply rooted in the practices of central 
planning still persist. Market-oriented reform can only induce incremental and 
slow changes in those practices before the new formal institutional framework can 
be finally established. In short, SOEs still enjoy the greatest privileges and 
government protection in market competition, and are simultaneously subject to 
the constraints and interventions from the government. 
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3.2.2 Efficiency and Legitimacy Pressures on Non-SOEs 
Non-SOEs, mainly the collective ownership enterprises and private 
ownership enterprises, are at first the byproducts of the economic reform, but later 
become the backbone of economic growth. They were borne out of entrepreneurs’ 
motivations to seek economic efficiency in response to the promotion of a market 
oriented economy. In general, non-SOEs receive little protection from the 
government and enjoy great autonomy. They are very similar to those firms in 
developed economies, where market competition is the main constraint of firm 
strategy. Because non-SOEs are responsible for their own performance, survival 
and development among market competitors, their consideration for economic 
efficiency are quite intense. As for the institutional legitimacy pressure, because 
the non-SOEs are the newly-borne ownership arrangement, no legacy from the 
central planning system is imposed on them. The government’s attitude towards 
the non-SOEs has gradually changed from tolerance to acknowledgement and to 
encouragement. During this course, unlike SOEs, non-SOEs are rarely expected to 
solve the unemployment, to contribute greatly to the fiscal budget or to sustain the 
strategic industries. Hence, the institutional legitimacy pressure on the non-SOEs, 
was comparatively low at the outset, and has been decreasing as the government 
grants more and more room for them to grow. 
However, because the non-SOEs developed not from the support from the 
government, but from the tolerance or acceptance of the government, they have no 
privileges in market competition. Without the privileges and protections 
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guaranteed by the government, non-SOEs have difficulty in securing necessary 
resources even in a competitive way, because the inefficient strategic factor 
markets and asymmetry information in the transaction process erect barriers to 
efficient market competition. They are more constrained by the weak institutional 
environment in the transition process than the SOEs. Accordingly: 
Proposition 2: During the economic transition, compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are 
more driven by social expectation or government regulation than by economic 
efficiency. Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs are more driven by economic efficiency 
than by social expectation or government regulation. 
 
3.3 Institutional Capital and Institutional Pressures 
Corresponding to the two strands of constraints, each firm has two sets of capital, 
one is to deal with economic efficiency pressures, and the other is to deal with 
institutional legitimacy pressures. The first one includes transactional capital and 
resource capital and the second one can be termed as the institutional capital 
(Miller & Sahmsie 1996; Oliver 1997). This category is somewhat similar to the 
classification of product relatedness and institutional relatedness by Peng et al. 
(2004). Broadly speaking, both institutional capital and institutional relatedness 
refer to a firm’s resources or capabilities to deal with its institutional environment. 
I have argued above that institutional pressure is more influential than economic 
efficiency pressure in the early stage of transition, so here I will focus on the 
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capability to deal with this type of pressure, i.e. institutional capital, to look into 
the impacts of the institutional capital on the diversification antecedents of 
China’s firms.  
I contend that in the early stage of economic transition, institutional capital 
plays an important role in firm strategy choice. Basically, institutional capital 
serves two related but distinct functions, one is to overcome the weak institutional 
environment or the institutional void and the other is to react to institutional 
legitimacy pressures. On one hand, every firm is exposed to the same weak 
institutional environment as characterized by most emerging economies. The 
greater the strength of a firm’s institutional capabilities, the better it can perform 
given this specific institutional environment constraint. On the other hand, 
different firms confront different magnitudes and types of institutional legitimacy 
pressures. Hence firms are required to possess different levels of institutional 
capabilities to deal with the differential pressures imposed on them.  
Proposition 3a: Both SOEs and non-SOEs are constrained by the weak 
institutional environment in the transition economy of China. 
Proposition 3b: Firms with strong institutional capital are able to deal with the 
weak institutional environment better than the firms with weak institutional 
capital. 
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CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter, I will integrate the literatures reviewed in Chapter 2 and 
propositions suggested in Chapter 3 to develop hypotheses with specific reference 
to the diversification strategy of China’s firms.  
On one hand, firms in a transition economy are faced with institutional 
pressures specific to the economic transitions. On the other hand, the strategies of 
these firms are constrained by the weak institutional frameworks, thus these firms 
have to manage these institutional constrains while pursuing economic efficiency. 
I contend that the antecedents of diversification strategy in a transition economy 
consist of elements of institutional pressures and institutional capabilities on top 
of economic efficiency elements. Diversification strategy in a transition economy 
is hence determined by the interplay between economic and non-economic factors 
(Li et al. 1998). Firms diversify with at least two purposes: resource building and 
utilization and effective management of external environment (Li & Wong 2003).  
In developing the hypotheses, I will focus on institutionally specific reasons 
including institutional pressures and institutional capital that may act as the 
antecedents of diversification strategies, aside from the efficiency considerations 
common to firms in developed economies.  
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4.1 Institutional Pressures and Diversification Antecedents 
As I have described in Chapter 2, SOEs and non-SOEs are different in terms of 
the regulative, normative and cognitive pressures they face. This difference exerts 
variable impacts on their diversification decisions. 
First, one theme of the economic reform in China is to build SOEs into large 
business groups with a large scale, strong competitive advantages with high 
profile. This is especially manifested in the report of the Third Plenary Session of 
the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 14, 2003). 
This continuous theme has actually motivated many firms to diversify in order to 
increase their scale and scope, and to cater to the preferences of the government. 
Actually, diversification in China may not necessarily represent a strategic choice 
of SOEs, but rather an outcome of the government administrative order (Li et al. 
1998). This regulative pressure mainly works on the SOEs and drives the SOEs to 
seek further investment. 
Secondly, due to the legacy of the central planning economic system, a large 
part of social responsibility in China is still imposed on business firms, explicitly 
or implicitly. This works as the normative pressure on the Chinese firms. For 
example, SOEs are expected to care for their employees, provide guaranteed 
employment, take care of the employees’ off-work life, build schools or 
kindergartens for the employees’ children, and provide pensions once the 
employees retire. It was not until late 1990s that the SOEs were allowed to lay off 
their employees in consideration of economic efficiency. Although the social 
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responsibility imposed on the SOEs are being transferred to some independent 
government institutions like Social Welfare and Security, the latter is far from 
mature in current China. In order to act like a mini-society to guard their 
employees from cradle to grave, the SOEs should be able to build large facilities 
to retain employees, and to produce enough profits to contribute to their retired 
employees. However, given the low profitability in most of the SOEs, the most 
convenient way to create employment positions is to expand, or to diversify into 
other businesses. As part of the reform plan of China, a firm is allowed to convert 
its excess workforces into ‘ancillary companies’ that engage in business 
opportunities outside of the firm’s core business, such as real-estate management 
and repair services (Li et al. 1998). The ‘ancillary companies’ are mostly in the 
service industry which has been a rapidly growing industry in China and is able to 
bring profits in the short run (Guthrie 1997).  
Drawing upon a sample of firms from Shanghai, Guthrie (1997) found that 
economically weak firms with a high labor/profit ratio were more likely to seek 
diversification strategy. Drawing upon case studies on two traditional SOEs of 
China (Wuhan Iron and Steel Co. and Baoshan Iron and Steel Co.), Li et al. (1998) 
found that due to the inherited social burden of employment, SOEs had a large 
pool of labor force in its core business. Because to lay off those work forces was 
not acceptable and even not allowed, these firms had to relocate the resources and 
would choose unrelated diversification to transfer the excess labor forces. This is 
a rational response to the institutional pressures because the unrelated 
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diversification can develop supporting facilities and improve internal efficiency 
and resource allocation such as the human resources and the fixed investment. 
Especially, these firms would implement unrelated diversification via internal 
adjustments, e.g. to establish auxiliary departments or ancillary companies. 
Thirdly, in response to the social expectation and the regulative promotion, 
managers of SOEs are on the track to expand. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
efficient incentives and reward systems, managers are not very concerned about 
the profitability of firms after their strategic decisions. They know that the 
government will not close the firm because it is unprofitable, and they are well 
aware that their position and reputation are decided not by the profitability, but by 
their level of acceptance by the government officials. To secure their own 
positions, managers are motivated to enlarge the firms, which is a symbol of 
growth and power that government officials prefer. This works as the cognitive 
pressures on the SOE’s managers’ strategic decisions. 
On the contrary, non-SOEs experience fewer pressures in terms of the 
regulative, normative or cognitive dimensions when they are deciding their 
growth strategy. The governments are taking an increasing lenient attitude towards 
the non-SOEs, providing more room for their autonomous development. Also, 
non-SOEs have few social responsibilities so that they can concentrate their 
resources on economic efficiency consideration rather than on the social welfare 
consideration. Furthermore, managers of non-SOEs are often entrepreneurs 
themselves, taking full responsibility for their business decisions, being aware of 
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the essence of market competition and accumulating strategic resources on their 
own. Compared with the SOEs, non-SOEs are more constrained by the resource 
availability. For example, SOEs are better able to obtain bank loans than 
non-SOEs. Aside from bank loans, many other strategic resources necessary for 
achieving economies of scale and scope are also a constraint for the non-SOEs’ 
diversification. 
Diversification strategy, especially unrelated diversification, leads a firm into 
a field unfamiliar to its current business and hence it is accompanied by 
uncertainty and risk. If the manager or decision maker should answer for the 
performance outcome of a diversification strategy, the decision to diversify cannot 
be hasty. Furthermore, diversification introduces a firm to a new business; hence it 
should require new resources. If a firm is short of the strategic resources or the 
abilities to obtain those strategic resources, it is deficient in the capabilities to 
diversify. Combining the above two reasons, managers of non-SOEs should be 
cautious about the diversification strategy, especially when it comes to the 
diversification into unrelated business. 
Taking into consideration the above comparisons between SOEs and 
non-SOEs in terms of the economic efficiency and the institutional pressures, I 
predict that: 
H1: SOEs are likely to show a higher level of diversification than non-SOEs.  
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4.2 Institutional Capital and Diversification Antecedents 
The above hypothesis captures the general pattern of the diversification strategy 
of Chinese firms, but leaves out a firm’s reaction towards institutional pressures. I 
have mentioned that economic transitions not only exert special institutional 
pressures on the firms embedded in that institutional environment, but also require 
these firms to manage the outside weak institutional frameworks through their 
accumulated institutional capital. Li and Wong (2003) stated that China’s firms, in 
order to manage the institutional environment, would seek unrelated 
diversification in the economic transitions process. Though unrelated 
diversification is not the only way in which a firm can manage a weak 
institutional framework, the firm capabilities underlining that type of management 
do affect the firm’s diversification decisions. Therefore, this section is aimed at 
incorporating a firm’s institutional capital into the analysis of diversification 
strategy choice. 
Different institutional pressures lead to different reactions to the questions of 
whether to diversify, and if actually diversifying, whether diversifying into related 
or unrelated business. Moreover, the institutional capabilities to respond to 
institutional pressures exert an influence on a firms’ diversification decision. By 
introducing the concept of “institutional relatedness” in contrast with the 
traditionally researched “product relatedness” in diversification literatures, Peng 
et al. (2004) pointed out that institutional relatedness played a large role in 
explaining the continuous diversification in emerging economies. 
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Conglomerates in emerging economies have been found to be associated with 
some discernible performance advantage, which has been documented by Chang 
and Hong (2000), Guillen (2000), Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Khanna and 
Rivkin (2001). Their findings have led to the belief that conglomeration may help 
firms overcome institutional imperfections prevalent in emerging economies 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). However, even though a diversification strategy has 
been a widely favored strategy among most firms in emerging economies, not 
every firm can implement a diversification strategy successfully. If a firm has no 
relevant institutional capital to handle its diversification attempts, especially its 
unrelated diversification, it can not take advantage of the benefits that 
conglomerates can bring under the context of an emerging economy.  
Li and Wong’s (2003) empirical study indicated that Chinese firms showed 
better economic performance when there was a match between related and 
unrelated diversification strategies. Both economically-related competitive 
advantages and institutional management capabilities are needed to enable firms 
to compete effectively. If a firm lacks institutional management capabilities, it is 
better for the firm to engage in a single business domain rather than to seek 
diversification. If a firm has strong capabilities to deal with the outside weak 
institutional environment, it can benefit from a combination of related and 
unrelated diversification strategies. Following this line of reasoning, I contend: 
Proposition 4: A firm’s institutional capital is positively related to the extent of its 
diversification. 
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4.2.1 Social Capital 
 I will now break down the concept of institutional capital according to Peng 
et al.’s (2004) arguments of institutional relatedness and develop hypotheses for 
each construct of institutional capital. However, because the institutional capital is 
actually informal and invisible, the measurement of institutional capital remains a 
significant challenge (Peng et al. 2004). To the best of my knowledge, no study 
has tried to measure institutional capital, and no study has linked institutional 
capital with diversification strategy empirically.  
 I will try to establish proxies for social capital, political capital and reputation 
capital with regard to the diversification strategy. Each of the three constructs is 
internally invisible and socially complex (Peng et al. 2004), hence the 
manifestation of each construct is multifaceted and necessarily carries noise. For 
example, Khanna and Palepu (2000) utilized miscellaneous knowledgeable 
observers to identify group linkages in their study on Chile, in a way to measure 
the social capital. In his study on Indonesia, Fisman (2001) relied on an 
idiosyncratic Suharto Dependency Index to measure firms’ connectedness with 
the former president Suharto, thus to measure the political connectedness of those 
firms outside the political sector. These measures are not the only measures that 
can be used to operationalize the constructs of institutional capital. Depending 
upon the nature of a certain study, we can choose different manifestations for 
these constructs and even choose more constructs for the concept of institutional 
capital. Accordingly, in following sections, I will emphasize on each construct’s 
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features specifically related to the diversification strategy and choose instruments 
for each construct accordingly.  
I begin with the concept of social capital. Social capital is the goodwill 
available to individuals or groups that can be mobilized to facilitate actions (Adler 
& Kwon 2002). The social capital of a firm is its informal embeddedness with the 
outside institutional environment (Peng et al. 2004), and its function rests on the 
network composition, motivation and ability content of network ties (Adler & 
Kwon 2002). Two perspectives have been used to understand the concept of social 
capital. One focuses on the external ties that an actor maintains with other actors 
and the other deals with the internal relationships within a collectivity. 
Corresponding to the theme of my study on institutional environment and firm 
diversification strategy, I will focus on the first perspective of social capital to 
look at the focal firm’s outside network.  
Network-based strategy is the major strategy in the early stages of economic 
transitions (Peng 2003). This type of strategy can take various forms, but each 
form has a similar purpose, that is to establish interpersonal ties not only with 
suppliers, buyers, government officials and institutional leaders that are directly 
related to a focal firm’s business operation, but also with many other 
organizations that are indirectly related to the firm’s business but can provide 
potential benefits, such as universities and public media. Along with this 
perspective, scholars have identified the linkage between social capital and firm 
diversification strategy. Gabbay and Zuckerman (1998), Hansen (1998) and Tsai 
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and Ghoshal (1998) all found that social capital was able to promote product 
innovation and resource exchanges, which can be important components of a 
diversification strategy. 
Diversification is associated with a variety of risks and uncertainties, 
especially under the context of asymmetric information and weak institutional 
environments in the transition economies. A firm needs enough information about 
a potential business before it could step into that business. Research has suggested 
that a diversification strategy requires an information system better than the one 
required for a strategy focusing on a single market (Gerhart & Milkovich 1990; 
Galbraith & Merrill 1991; Gomez-Mejia 1992). 
One prominent role of social network is the channel of information flow it 
provides, as external ties are “important conduits for informational and social 
influences on decision making” (Geletkanyca & Hambrick 1997: 655). Thus, a 
social network has the potential to provide necessary information for the firm’s 
diversification decision. In this study I emphasize on a network’s function of 
transmitting information. To this end, I focus on the network composition, which 
represents the key characteristics that define a social network of an actor (Rangan 
2000). Under this heading, I probe the rubric of network composition and capture 
two characteristics of a network: the network breadth and the network diversity.  
Because the information disclosure in China is not supervised efficiently, 
inter-organizational communication is an important way for a firm to obtain 
knowledge of other businesses and to overcome the institutional void. Moreover, 
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unstable environments due to economic transitions are characterized by 
unpredictable changes and volatility (Sharfman & Dean 1991), leading to high 
information processing cost on firm leaders (Carpenter & Fredrickson 2001).  
The success of the implementation of firm strategy in this kind of 
environment depends to a large extent on the firm leaders’ capability to collect 
and process information (Carpenter & Westphal 2001). Through formal or 
informal communications via a manager’s network, the leaders of a firm can 
observe the operation of other businesses and obtain firsthand information of the 
consequences of that operation (Gulati & Westphal 1999). This information 
sourcing tactic is able to lead to faster and more accurate information processing 
(Day & Lord 1992). The more firms that are available as references, the more 
information a firm can obtain. A broad network is able to facilitate successful and 
efficient information exchange since this kind of network is likely to link “actors 
with non-redundant and pertinent information” (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; 
Mizruchi 1996; Rangan 2000: 822). A network with many peer firms can be a rich 
information resource for a focal firm’s strategic decisions. 
H2a: The breadth of a firm’s network is positively related to the extent of its 
diversification. 
 
Another rubric of network composition I will focus on is network diversity, 
which also affects information flows via a social network. The social network acts 
like conduits through which information flows affect the managerial views of the 
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outside environment and forms a set of alternative strategic choices and changing 
contingencies (Geletkanyca & Hambrick 1997). The more diverse the businesses 
that a firm can observe through the network, the more various information the 
firm can obtain because businesses with different strategies and different business 
environments can typically provide a firm with greater knowledge and insight 
about a broad range of potential business opportunities (Carpenter & Westphal 
2001). If the focal firm is concentrated among firms within the same industry or 
product segments, it is less likely to notice alternative strategic choices emerging 
in other industries or segments. With rich information about other businesses, a 
focal firm can overcome poor information disclosure in the public markets in 
China and thereby strengthen its confidence to step into other businesses.  
H2b: The diversity of a firm’s network is positively related to the extent of its 
diversification. 
 
4.2.2 Political Capital 
Political capital refers to a firm’s political connectedness with political actors. 
Just like other forms of physical capital, political capital also requires investment 
and can provides benefits to the investor. The benefits derived from political 
capital include political effectiveness, public reputation, resource availability and 
social legitimacy (Boddewyn & Brewer 1994). In the context of an emerging 
economy, political capital grants other benefits. Fisman (2001) indicated that 
political connections with the president of Indonesia had an obvious effect on a 
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firm’s stock value. As Child and Lu (1996) indicated, investment decisions in 
China have been largely decided by the government authorities who control scare 
resources and have the rights to seek a balance of priorities within the entire 
economy, rather than by the enterprises themselves. Without strong political 
connectedness with the government authorities, a firm is more likely to be denied 
in its investment proposals than a firm that has a strong lobbying capability. In 
other words, the quality of the relationship between firm leaders and government 
officials weighs heavily in the firm’s expansion decision. 
Additionally, political capital to some extent protects a firm from the 
consequences of its inefficient strategic decisions. One case in point is the human 
resource management practices of many Chinese firms. Due to the inefficient 
labor market in China, managers of the firms cannot be employed effectively 
through market mechanisms and competent persons have difficulty in competing 
for their desired positions in a focal firm. Accompanying this scenario, 
government officials may require a firm to appoint their relatives and friends to 
important positions in a firm. By complying with this requirement, a firm can 
improve the interpersonal relationship with the government officials and 
accumulate more political capital. If there is no position available in a focal firm, 
the firm’s leaders may even create new positions by establishing new divisions. 
This line of diversification is not out of economic efficiency considerations, but it 
is protected by the political capital that the leaders possess. In this case, the 
political capital induces the focal firm to diversify, and the focal firm can obtain 
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more political capital through diversification. 
Diversification requires resources and incurs risks, and political capital can 
help a firm to gain access to resources and to mitigate risks. With strong political 
capital, a firm is able to establish legitimacy among political sectors. The political 
legitimacy smoothes the way for the firm to access scarce resources, such as bank 
loans sponsored by the government agencies, and market entry privileges licensed 
by the government. Furthermore, when a firm’s diversification encounters 
difficulties, the political capital also provides certain protections such as the 
government-sponsored merger or acquisition of a weak firm by a strong firm. 
Realizing these potential benefits of political capital, a firm has the intention to 
diversify if it possesses strong political capital, even if its competitive capabilities 
in terms of further diversification are not very strong. Hence I predict that: 
H3: The political capital of a firm is positively related to the extent of its 
diversification. 
 
4.2.3 Reputation Capital 
Reputation capital refers to evaluative characteristics of a firm that are 
ascribed by external observers (Fombrun 1993). Reputation capital is accumulated 
by the past actions of a firm and signals the future behavior of that firm. It 
involves at least three factors: the firm, the observers and the information 
diffusion network such as the word-of-mouth communication (Shenkar & 
Yuchtmann 1997). Reputation capital serves at least four functions: reducing 
 55
uncertainty on the part of customers, suppliers and even competitors; forcing a 
firm to fulfill promises or act according to its agreements; facilitating a firm to 
expand to other businesses under the same umbrella of a good reputation; and 
filling the information needs of stakeholders by diversifying into multiple 
industries (Khanna & Palepu 1997).  
The firm’s brand name reputation represents the evaluation by the market, 
including the firm’s suppliers, competitors and customers. It is the most obvious 
manifestation of a firm’s reputation in a market. Many firms have leveraged their 
existing brand names to step into other businesses through brand extension (using 
a brand name successfully established for one segment or channel to enter another 
one in the same broad market) and brand stretching (transferring the successful 
brand name to quite a different market). The businesses into which they leverage 
their brand names include not only the related businesses on the same value chain, 
but also the unrelated businesses without strong strategic fit with their existing 
businesses. Furthermore, as a type of information-based asset that is easy to be 
imitated and duplicated once the key information is disclosed, a brand name is not 
suitable to be licensed or rented to other owners. The user of brand name is likely 
to sell inferior products under the reputation of the original owner of that brand 
name, and thereby destroy the long term value of that brand name (Morck & 
Yeung 2003). 
A highly-ranked brand name has the potential to become an excess resource 
that can be used for diversification because the more it is utilized, the stronger it 
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will become. Also, there is the necessity to internalize the transfer of a brand name 
when diversify into other businesses in order to avoid opportunistic behavior. 
Hence I predict that:  
H4: The brand name reputation of a firm is positively related to the extent of its 
diversification. 
 
 Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 have a summary of the propositions and hypotheses 
in the last two chapters. 
 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I developed five hypotheses with regard to the diversification 
extents of Chinese firms, integrating three key concepts: institutional pressures, 
institutional capital and diversification antecedents. The arguments to support the 
hypotheses are: 1) the economic transitions in China constitute a specific 
institutional environment that exerts institutional pressures on the firms embedded 
in that context; 2) SOEs are pressed to diversify by the regulative pressure, 
normative pressure and cognitive pressure in their strategic choices; non-SOEs are 
less influenced by the institutional pressures than the SOEs; 3) firms are 
heterogeneous in terms of their capital and capabilities to deal with the 
institutional pressures; the stronger the institutional capital, the better the firm can 
handle the institutional pressures; social capital, political capital and reputation 
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capital are three constructs of the institutional capital; 4) diversification requires 
resources and capabilities, and diversification in a transitional economy requires 
the social capital, political capital and reputation capital to overcome the 
institutional void; correspondingly, a firm possessing strong social capital, 
political capital and reputation capital is more likely to implement a 
diversification strategy, in the context of a transition economy. 
These hypotheses try to capture the institutional considerations on top of the 
economic efficiency considerations that have been identified in the diversification 
literatures, and try to capture the specific institutional characteristics of China 
during its economic transition process. Firms may seek diversification due to the 
institutional pressures; hence firms exposed to heterogeneous institutional 
pressures show different patterns of diversification. Firms may also implement 
diversification strategy out of their institutional capital; hence firms possessing 
heterogeneous institutional capital show different patterns of diversification 
strategies. These two aspects of institutional consideration interact with each other 
and enrich our understandings of the diversification strategies of Chinese firms. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter describes the research design with which I will conduct the empirical 
tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The main contents are the sample 
description, the definition of variables and the methods for tests. 
 
5.1 Data and Sample 
The setting for my study is a set of companies comprising China’s listed 
companies. Although the arguments in the hypotheses development section are 
not confined to the case of publicly listed companies, a sample of Chinese listed 
companies is advantageous in at least two ways. First, the information of listed 
companies is the most consistent, accurate and transparent among the information 
available for all types of Chinese firms. Second, the sample of listed companies 
consists of different types of firms including state-owned enterprises and non 
state-owned enterprises, which is a necessary source of variance to be able to 
construct an empirical test of my hypotheses. 
 The sample covers all the China’s listed companies from 1997 to 2001. In 
1999, there was a marked transition in the ownership structure of China’s 
economy. This transition was manifested in the fact that non-SOEs contributed 
more than 50% to the GDP growth for the first time. As a sub-sample of Chinese 
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firms, listed companies also reflected to some extent this transition in ownership 
structure. Since ownership differences in SOEs and non-SOEs is one focus of my 
study, I considered 1999 as a division point and included two years before 1999 as 
well as two years after 1999 in my sample. Hence I designed the sample period to 
be from 1997 to 2001. 
I derived the basic sample from the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, as well as other professional stock websites 
(http://www.sunsc.com.cn, http://www.sse.com.cn, http://www.sse.org.cn and 
http://www.cnlist.com). From these data sources, I first established one 
comprehensive list of all publicly listed companies in the A share stock market of 
China for every year in the sample period, incorporating basic information for 
each company such as its stock ID. This ID was assigned to every publicly listed 
company by the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
served as the key reference for my further search for information on individual 
companies when I tried to complete information from different data sources and 
combine information about a certain company from different years.  
When there was inconsistency for a certain company, I derived the data 
referring to that firm’s annual report in a focal year. Furthermore, to complement 
the necessary variables of each company, such as the shareholder identity and 
equity share distribution, brand name and the product segments, I also referred to 
other databases. One is the Database of Financial Data and Marketing Data of 
China Capital Market (CSMAR). Others are Bloomberg, Datastream and 
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Worldscope. I consulted these data sources when there was inconsistency across 
resources so that I could make comparisons, or when there were missing data so 
that I could make the database as complete as possible. Finally, the comparison 
across data resources is able to increase the data reliability and completeness. 
For each company, I collected the following relevant information: stock ID, 
product segments and sales of each segment, total assets, total debts, total equity, 
income tax payable, cost of goods sold, total sales, cash flow, industry affiliation, 
top 10 shareholders and equity share of each shareholder, ownership identity of 
top 10 shareholders, brand name and location. I then derived dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables for the empirical tests, drawing upon 
these collected data.  
There had been rapid growth in the stock market of China from 1997 to 2001. 
The total stock market value was 1752 billion RMB and occupied 23.44% of the 
GDP in 1997, while in 2001, the total stock value was 4352 billion RMB and 
occupied 45.37% of the GDP in 2001. 730 companies were listed in the Shanghai 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1997, but this number increased to over 
1,150 in 2001.  
These companies covered 10 broad industrial categories: Agriculture, Mining, 
Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale and Retailing, Finance 
and Insurance, Real Estate, Social Services, Media and Conglomerates. The 
Manufacturing industry group is further divided into 10 sub-groups, such as food, 
petrochemicals, machinery and pharmaceuticals. In order to establish consistency 
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with previous studies, I translated the industry divisions and coded industries 
according to an SIC categorization for each product of a company.  
Table 5-1 illustrates the industry distribution of the listed companies in the 
two stock markets in 2001. Noticeable from the table is that manufacturing firms 
constitute the majority of China’s listed companies (64.4%). The next largest 
percentage of firms operate in the Wholesale and Retailing, Transportation, which 
account for about 7.8% of the listed companies. The industries of Agriculture, 
Mining, Construction and Social Services are not very active in the stock markets. 
This general pattern applies to the companies in each year from 1997 to 2001. 
Though the exact percentage may be slightly different for some industries in some 




5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Extent of diversification (ED): As I want to test the hypotheses about the 
relationship between institutional pressures and a firm’s diversification extent, and 
the relationship between institutional capabilities and a firm’s diversification 
extent, the extent of diversification is the key dependent variable.  
In the diversification literatures, researchers have used three types of 
measures to capture the extent of diversification. The first one is the SIC count 
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measure of diversification (Varadarajan & Ramanjuam 1987); the second one is 
Rumelt’s classification method; and the third one is the Entropy and Herfindahl 
measures of diversification, which are continuous measure. The Entropy measure 
has been argued to be the most effective and valid one to identify a firm’s 
diversification level (Hoskisson et al. 1993); hence in this study I will employ this 
one as the dependent variable. 
The Entropy measure of diversification is a continuous measure widely used 
and validated by researchers (Jacquemin & Berry 1979; Palepu 1985; Baysinger 
& Hoskisson 1989; Chatterjee & Blocher 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1992). It captures 
the feature of the continuous nature of diversification and addresses the strategic 
differences among different products. It not only accounts for the number of 
product categories, but also addresses the sales distribution among different 
business categories. The entropy measure has two components: related 
diversification and unrelated diversification. This approach is similar to Hoskisson 
et al. (1993) and Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989), who differentiated RD 
(Related Diversification) and UD (Unrelated Diversification) to investigate a 
firm’s total diversification. I will try my empirical tests with a firm’s total 
diversification as dependent variable; but also with RD and UD as dependent 
variables. I will calculate these measures for China’s listed companies according 
to approach specified by Davis and Duhaime (1989). For either related or 
unrelated diversification, the formula for calculation is: 
Entropy measure = ∑Pi*ln(1/Pi) 
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where Pi is the sales share of segment i in total sales and ln(1/Pi) is the logarithm 
of the inverse of the i segment sale. The logarithm value is the weight applied to 
each segment so as to differentiate the relative importance of each segment’s 
contribution to the total sales. The calculation of related diversification (RD) uses 
the sales in 2-digit industry group as the sales in the formula; and the calculation 
of the unrelated diversification (UD) uses the total firm sales as the sales in the 
formula. The addition of the related diversification and unrelated diversification is 
the total diversification for each company (TD = RD + UD). The value of this 
measure ranges from 0 to a positive value that can exceed 1. A value of zero (0) 
represents a company that operates only in one business. The higher the value, the 
greater the extent of a company’s diversification is. 
 
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
Ownership identity: I measure ownership identity using an indicator variable. 
If a firm is an SOE, I assign a value of one (1) to this variable; otherwise it has the 
value of zero (0). Here I will resort to the top 10 shareholders of each listed 
company. Because the shareholders of a listed company may take one of several 
possible identities, such as state government, state ministry and individual, I will 
first assign these shareholders to either one of two summary categories: state or 
non-state shareholders. Table 5-2 shows the details of the categories that I have 
assigned to the shareholders of Chinese listed companies. Among the total 18 
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categories, I include the first 10 categories in calculating the accumulative state 
ownership. I assign a value of one when the aggregate state shareholdings equal 
50 percent or more of total shareholdings in the firm, zero for otherwise. My 
empirical tests will include sensitivity tests that define an SOE using state 
shareholdings of the 40 percent as well as the 30 percent cut-off point, which is 
the minimum to define an SOE. 
 
Social Capital: Since I focus on the function of information flow of a social 
network of a firm, I will probe into the features of a firm’s ownership connection 
with other firms. First, I choose the social network of a firm’s top management 
level rather than the other various network forms related to any other components 
of the firm Second, I emphasize the function of information flow of the social 
network, rather than other roles the social network may play. As I have mentioned 
in chapter 4, I focus on the network composition and try to capture the network 
breadth and network diversity in my discussion on the role of information 
transmission of social network. Accordingly, I define the number of network 
members as network breadth and define the member diversity in terms of the 
industry affiliation as network diversity. I utilize these two measures to proxy a 
firm’s social capital in the managerial level. To develop these two measures, I will 
employ information of the top ten shareholders of each listed company and look 
into the magnitude of shareholder overlaps. Two reasons warrant my choice of the 
two measures to proxy the firm’s social capital. 
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First, among the various social networks of a firm, management level 
networks are the ones that can exert a strong effect on strategic choices (Child 
1972; Hambrick & Mason 1984; Granovetter 1985; Burt 1997; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick 1997; Peng & Luo 2000). Furthermore, “the social capital embedded in 
managerial ties may be more important in imperfect competition characterized by 
weak institutional support and distorted information” (Peng & Luo 2000: 486). 
Overlapping shareholders establish some connections among the shareholders of 
different companies. The same owner sends its delegates to be the board members 
of two companies and the two delegates positioned in the two different companies 
are likely to be in close connection. These kinds of managerial ties provide a 
manager with firsthand information about the businesses of other firms, channel 
communications between different businesses of many firms, and consolidate 
relationships between managers of many firms (Gulati & Westphal 1999). During 
the diversification decision process, a manager’s knowledge of other businesses 
and other firms is essential. Hence, overlapping shareholders can be a key channel 
for a manager to obtain knowledge of other business areas.  
Second, under the context of a transition economy in China in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, security markets were at a nascent stage of development, as 
accompanied by great uncertainty and information asymmetry, which induced 
managers to observe and even imitate other firms’ strategy via managerial ties 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Powell 1990; Peng & Luo 2000). Overlapping 
shareholder ties provide a means for the managers to observe other firms’ strategy. 
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This kind of social capital is especially important when there are not many 
competitors or peers to observe as guiding reference frame (Burt 1997).  
In terms of the specifics of the calculation, I will identify the top ten 
shareholders for each listed firm, and calculate the overlap of the shareholders 
among the sample firms. If a large number of firms have overlapping shareholders 
with the focal firm, this would then indicate a strong social network for that firm, 
and this value represents a firm’s network breadth. In essence, this value is a 
count of the number of firms with overlapping shareholders.  
I make a refinement on this measure by probing further into the overlapping 
shareholders by coding the industry identification of the firms within a certain 
network. This measure aims to capture the second characteristic of the network 
composition, i.e., the network diversity. With regard to the information flow via a 
social network and the diversification strategy, I will define the network diversity 
according to the industry affiliation. As an example, take the case where five firms 
have at least one common shareholder with a focal firm A. If most of the five 
firms are in the same main industry as A, then A’s this network is industrially 
dense, otherwise if these five firms are in different industries, then A’s network is 
industrially sparse. I call this measurement network diversity. To obtain the value 
for this variable, I calculate the ratio of the number of the firms in a focal firm’s 
network that has the same main industry to the total number of firms in a focal 
firm’s network. As this ratio involves the number of firms having the same main 
industry, which is the counter measure of industry diversity, the expected sign of 
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this variable is negative. 
 
Political Capital: In the context of China, the main challenge in measuring 
political capital is that a firm can be possibly related with numerous separate 
government decision-making bodies. The analysis of a firm’s political capital 
requires evaluation of these various connections as well as the development of a 
method to aggregate those connections (Fisman 2001). The use of ownership 
levels of shareholder can help to address this issue, as I will describe below. 
In the process of economic reform in China, central government control has 
been gradually decentralized to local governments (provincial and municipal). 
The ownership arrangement of SOEs and non-SOEs in China can be broken down 
into the following categories according to the different levels of government 
administration: central government ownership, provincial or municipal ownership, 
local government ownership and private ownership (Walder 1995). Along with 
this hierarchy, the political power of each level of government decreases in the 
same order in which firm’s are listed. Central government owners have the 
greatest political power, and private owners the weakest. Accordingly, the 
political capital of a firm owned by each level of government also decreases, as 
ownership levels by private and local government owners increase relative to 
provincial, municipal and state ownership.  
This statement is supported by the idea that the authority hierarchy of China 
is a political power staircase. The central government is the top of the stairs in 
terms of its authority. The central government designs macro economic plans for 
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the lower levels of government to implement; it initiates various regulations and 
rules to constrain the lower level of governments; and it plans the resource 
allocation of the entire economy. A local government’s authority is confined to its 
region and is restricted by adherence to policies and regulations of the central 
government.  
A firm owned by a high level of government owners also has greater 
exposure to political resources than a firm owned in large part by lower levels of 
government. The economic system of China is interpersonal network capitalism 
rather than a rational-legal bureaucracy, as in Western economies (Boisot & Child 
1996). If a firm’s owner is from a high level of government, a firm is able to 
establish a good reputation, obtain scarce resources and even seek economic rents.  
Another point is that a firm owned by a high level of government has greater 
bargaining power than that owned by a low level of government. By providing 
large amount of employment and taxes, a large firm has more influence on 
political sectors than a small firm does. Continuing with this idea, in China, the 
industrial base of each level of government decreases dramatically (Walder 1995), 
which means that the higher the government level, the larger its industrial base. 
This further implies that high level of government of government ownership can 
be related to high level of deployment of resources for economic activity. 
In line with these ideas about the importance of ownership by level and type, 
I construct my measure of political capital in the following manner. First, I 
identify the top 10 shareholders of a listed company. For China’s listed companies, 
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the equity share is generally divided into two types, one is the share that is 
marketable in the stock market, and the other is the share that is non-marketable. 
The marketable share is in most cases far less than the non-marketable share. 
Therefore, the shareholder change due to the selling and buying in the stock 
market only constitutes a negligible change in terms of the ownership status of the 
focal listed company. The information of the top 10 shareholders is relatively 
consistent across years and hence is able to reflect the company’s political capital 
via the ownership identity in a consistent way. Second I code ownership to 
identify the top 10 shareholders and classify them into one of the following four 
types: private, local government, provincial government and central government. 
Third, I aggregate the equity share percentage of those shareholders if they fall 
into the same type of ownership identity. In this way I will obtain four 
percentages. Fourth I look at the aggregate ownership percentages of each type, 
and code one of four ownership types according to which type of ownership 
identity constitutes the largest aggregate shareholder. In the event of a tie, I code 
the highest ranked political owner as the main owner for the purposes of variable 
construction. With these codes, I develop an ordinal measure of a firm’s political 
capital, where the value of one (1) marks private ownership, two (2) indicates 
local government ownership, three (3) equates to provincial or municipal 
ownership, and four (4) is central government ownership. Finally, based upon the 
four ordinal numbers (1, 2, 3, 4), I define three alternative dummy variables: PC1, 
PC2 and PC3. Here PC1 is 1 if the firm falls into the central government 
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ownership; PC2 is 1 if the firm falls into the central government ownership or 
provincial or municipal ownership; PC3 is 1 if the firm falls into the central 
government ownership, provincial or municipal ownership or local government 
ownership; 0 otherwise. The reasoning underlying this method is that it is able to 
compare the case of high political capital and the case of low political capital as 
measured with ownership levels. 
Besides the categorical measure of political capital using the difference in 
ownership levels, I will also introduce a continuous measure of political capital 
(StatePC), with the information of shareholder equity share. Referring to the 
measure of ownership identity in the previous section and the categories in Table 
5-2, I utilize the aggregate stock share of the shareholders who belong to those 
categories that are related to the state. Specifically, I will calculate the 
accumulative equity share of those shareholders falling into the first 10 categories 
in Table 5-2. This continuous and aggregate measure, though without 
differentiating the detailed ownership levels, indicates to some extent the political 
capital involved in the focal firm. Whether the shareholder has close relationship 
with the central government, or the shareholder has close relationship with the 
local government, they both introduce political power into the operation of the 
firm, and help the firm to secure resources or avoid risks in their own realm. 
Broadly, the higher the aggregate equity share by state related shareholders, the 
stronger the political capital possessed by that firm. Hence the expected sign of 
this variable is positive. 
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Reputation Capital: I use brand name to measure the firm’s reputation 
capital. Brand name is an indicator variable that represents the value of a firm’s 
brand relative to other firms in China. To develop this measure, I will refer to the 
data provided by the brand name reputation institutions that are authorized by the 
State Administration for Industry & Commerce to evaluate and rank the brand 
names of Chinese firms. The evaluations and ranks of a brand name by these 
institutions fall into two categories: nation-level brand name and world-level 
brand name, and the world-level brand name is included in the nation-level brand 
name. Accordingly, I will combine these two ranks and code the brand name 
variable with values of one if the brand name of a firm falls into nation-level 
brand name or world-level brand name. If a brand name is found in none of the 
two categories, then I code it with a value of zero, which effectively is the lowest 
rank of brand names. 
 
5.2.3 Control Variables 
I first control for some conventional variables related to a firm’s 
diversification level (e.g., Li & Wong 2003; Mayer & Whittington 2003; Li & Li 
1996): 1) Firm size: the logarithm of a firm’s total assets and the logarithm of a 
firm’s total sales in a certain year; and 2) Firm leverage: the debt to equity ratio, to 
capture the capital structure or the long-term liquidity. 
I will also control for other potential influences on a firm’s diversification 
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decisions so as to explore alternative explanations of the empirical tests. 
Economic efficiency is one imperative that could drive a firm to diversify under 
the context of imperfect market (Hoskisson & Hitt 1990). The diversification 
literatures has identified that excess resources are one major reason for a firm to 
diversify its activities (Penrose 1959; Teece 1982; Wernerfelt 1984; Hoskisson & 
Hitt 1990) and three types of resources (tangible, intangible and financial assets) 
can facilitate diversification implementation (Chattterjee & Wernerfelt 1988). 
Taking into consideration the data availability for China’s listed companies, I 
control for the firm’s excess resources with two variables: 1) The ratio of costs of 
goods sold to the total sales, which measures the overall efficiency of a company’s 
management and business operation (Li & Wong 2003). Management efficiency is 
a type of resource that is inimitable, hard to be substituted or exchanged. High 
management efficiency indicates that a firm has excess managerial resources to 
further expand into more businesses and hence affects the likelihood of its 
diversification extent. According to the operationalization of this measure, the 
expected sign of management efficiency is negative, as the greater the costs of 
goods sold, the less efficient the management is. 2) Free cash flow, which 
represents the excess financial resources and are probably the most flexible 
resources for the purpose of diversification (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt 1988). The 
free cash flow is also likely to affect the type of diversification (Jensen 1986; 
Chatterjee & Wernerfelt 1988). I will calculate the free cash flow for China’s 
listed companies as: net income – income taxes – gross interest expense on 
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long-term debt – dividends paid on preferred stock – dividends paid on common 
stock (Lehn & Poulsen 1989: 777; Schuler et al. 2002). 
A firm’s prior performance levels can exert an influence on its diversification 
decisions (Grant et al. 1988; Park 2002). It is reasonable to predict that a firm’s ex 
ante performance exerts an influence on its diversification patterns as well. To 
control for this influence, I create the variable: Previous performance. I 
operationalize this measure as the average of performance (ROA) in the three 
years that immediately precede an observation. I will also use the three-year 
average of ROE and Tobin’s Q to run robustness tests. 
I control for firm age using two variables. The first firm age variable is the 
number of years between the year of an observation (1997 through 2001) and a 
firm’s foundation year. The second variable for firm age is the number of years 
between the year of an observation (1997 through 2001) and a firm’s IPO year. 
For a firm to become a publicly listed company in China, it has to satisfy many 
requirements such as its profitability in the past three years and its capital 
situation. In other words, the IPO year of a firm represents a big change or 
transition during its development direction; hence it has implications on a firm’s 
strategic choices which can differ before and after an IPO. 





The data structure of my sample is longitudinal data consisting of observations 
from five years (1997 to 2001). Time-series and cross-sectional data can not only 
capture change in the institutional environment over time, that can exert an 
influence on each observation (company), but it also allows for the individual 
effect of each observation who responds to the outside institutional changes 
according to its institutional capabilities. I will employ both random effects 
models and fixed effects models for the empirical tests (Wooldridge 2002). The 
most widely used empirical models to estimate cross-sectional time series models 
include the random effects GLS, the fixed effects GLS and the MLE random 
effects models. I will carry out the three estimation methods respectively on the 
sample data. 
The basic relationship among the variables can be symbolized as:  
ED = F(OI, SC, PC, RC, CONTROLS, u) 
In the fixed effects GLS models, the estimation takes the following form: 
iititiitiit uuControlsBXXBEDED −++−=− 21 )(  t=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
where the time-average of each variable is excluded. X is the vector of 
explanatory variables, and Controls is the vector of control variables. 
For the random effects GLS models, the estimation takes the following form: 
itiititit uAControlsBXBBED ++++= 210  t=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
where Ai represents the unobserved effects that are uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variables. 
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The MLE random effects estimations fully maximize the likelihood of the 
random-effects models.  
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 CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
This chapter describes the empirical test results based upon the research design in 
chapter 5, and discusses the research findings that corroborate or contradict the 
predictions developed in chapter 4, as well as some new findings that have 
implications for further theoretical developments. 
  
6.1 Estimations 
Table 6-1 gives out the descriptive statistics of the variables used in models 
estimation and their Pearson Correlations. There is no serious co-linearity 
problem among the variables, except between the different measures of SOE 
identity based upon the three cut-off points, and between the continuous political 
measure and the SOE identity variable. Both strong correlations are not 
unexpected, since they are derived from the same original data—the equity share 
of the top 10 shareholders. Allowing for the correlations between these two 
groups of variables, I will separate them in the model estimation process. 
I used the Maximum Likelihood Random Effects models to estimate the 
variables. I also tried the random effects GLS and fixed effects GLS estimation 
methods. In the case of random effects GLS, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test for the random effects estimations indicates that the sigma-u (the 
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unit specific residual) is around 0.012, which means the primary assumption of 
random effect GLS (sigma-u=0) is slightly violated. In the case of fixed effects 
GLS, the estimations does not produce good estimators for the related variables 
and the fitness of goodness is not promising. I again tried the Panel-Corrected 
Standard Errors to correct heteroskedasticity or correlated disturbance, but this 
correction could not be performed because of the unbalanced panel data set in my 
sample. Hence I resort to the maximum likelihood random effects estimators, 
which is able to provide a unified approach to estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). The 
estimation results reported here are therefore the results from STATA, specified by 
the maximum likelihood estimation method. 
I ran the estimations on the three entropy measures of diversification: the total 
diversification, the unrelated diversification and the unrelated diversification. 
Instead of the calculation method specified in Chapter 5, I calculated the three 
measures in the other way around. Drawing upon the available data of 
diversification and sales distribution of Chinese listed companies, I first calculated 
the total diversification using the 4-digit SIC classification of product segments. 
Then I combined the sales of those business in the same 2-digit SIC classification 
and calculated the unrelated diversification entropy measure. The difference of the 
total diversification and the unrelated diversification entropy measure is the 
measure of related diversification. The Appendix formula abstracted from Palepu 
(1985) shows the underlying reasoning for this calculation. Having decomposed 
the entropy measure of diversification into the three measures, I then ran 
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estimations on them respectively. Table 6-2 has the results for total diversification, 
Table 6-3 shows the results for unrelated diversification and Table 6-3 gives the 
estimations for related diversification. 
I carried out the maximum likelihood estimations for each measure in the 
same format. I first ran the baseline model with only the control variables. Then I 
added explanatory variable individually into the baseline model to respectively 
decide the significance of each independent variable. After that, I included most of 
the explanatory variables and the control variables in one model to investigate the 
overall significance of the model. Noticeable here is that I included the SOE 
dummy and the political capital measure separately due to their correlations. 
 
6.2 Estimations Results 
In the following sections, I will arrange the results in the order of hypotheses and 
compare the results from the three entropy measures of diversification extent. In 
doing so, I can study the influences of institutional pressures and institutional 
capabilities on different patterns of diversification. The decomposed 
understanding of the three types of diversifications can in turn enhance our main 
understanding of diversification in a whole. 
 
6.2.1 Ownership Identity (SOE and non-SOE) and Diversification Extent 
Arguing that SOE is influenced by more institutional pressures than non-SOE, 
 79
and that the institutional pressures on firm strategy in the process of economic 
transition of China works to a great extent on the diversification choice, I 
predicted that SOE is likely to show a greater extent of diversification than 
non-SOE. I used three alternative variables to decide whether a firm is SOE or not: 
S50, S40 and S30. Each of these three variables is derived from the aggregate 
equity share of shareholders owned by or related to state. 
 From the models in Table 6-2, which shows results for estimations on total 
diversification, we can see that S50, S30 are significantly and negatively related to 
the total diversification extent, while S40 is slightly significant and is positively 
related to the total diversification extent. The same pattern applies to the unrelated 
diversification, results of which are tabulated in Table 3. But for related 
diversification in Table 4, none of the three measures is significant. 
 The sign of coefficients change from negative to positive from S30 to S40, 
and then from positive to negative from S40 to S50, indicating that the cut-off 
point of 40% equity share could be a possible starting point of new insights. To 
investigate this possibility, I then looked into the descriptive statistics of the 
variable (A) representing aggregate equity share by state in the sample. The mean 
value for variable A is 50.14% and the median is 54.69%, which means that the 
cut-off point of 50% represents more cases than the other two cut-off points, 
hence the variable S50 is supposed to represent the situation of more firms than 
S40 and S30 do. To proceed with this, I also excluded the firms with below 30% 
aggregate equity share by state and studied the descriptive statistics of variable A 
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for the rest firm. The mean value for variable A is now 56.88% for the sub-sample 
and the median is 57.88%. This further confirms that the cut-off point of 40% 
does not represent most of the SOEs. With these evidences, I focused on the 
variable S50 to check the hypotheses in the following models as well as 
discussions. 
 Drawing upon the negative and significant coefficients of S50 in most of the 
models for three diversification measures, I conclude that H1 is not supported. 
Opposite to my prediction that SOE is likely to show greater diversification extent, 
non-SOE instead is associated with greater diversification, especially the 
unrelated diversification. This argument is at least applicable to the Chinese listed 
companies. 
 
6.2.2 Social Capital and Diversification Extent 
I resorted to network width and network diversity to measure the social 
capital. Both network width and network diversity are derived from the top 10 
shareholders of the Chinese firms. The greater the number of firms having 
overlapping shareholders with the focal firm, the stronger the network breadth is. 
The more industries involved in one network of a focal firm, the greater the 
network diversity is. I argued that the social capital in the form of broad network 
and diverse network could provide information and resources to the focal firm for 
its diversification decision, hence I predicted that network breadth and network 
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diversity were positively related to the focal firm’s diversification extent. 
 From the estimations on total diversification, I find that network breadth is 
slightly significant but negative in one model but insignificant in the other models. 
From the estimations on unrelated diversification, network breadth is significant 
at 5% level but negative in most models. From the estimations on related 
diversification, network breadth is slightly significant but positive in most models. 
The results show that network breadth performs differently in the three types of 
diversification. Hence H2a gains no evidence in the case of total diversification, 
gains support from the case of related diversification, but is disproved by the case 
of unrelated diversification. 
 The variable of network diversity, whose expected sign is negative, works in 
the case of total diversification, but not in the case of related diversification. 
Either in estimations on total diversification, or in estimations on unrelated 
diversification, the network diversity variable is significant at 1% level, which 
provides strong support to H2b. 
 I also investigated the interaction between network breadth and network 
diversity, as the two rubrics of network is likely to be interrelated. However, the 
interaction item does not produce significant results and the addition of this item 
does not make obvious improvement on the entire model. Hence I do not include 
this item in the results reported here and temporarily conclude that the interaction 
between network breadth and network diversity has no obvious effect on the 
extent of diversification. 
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6.2.3 Political Capital and Diversification Extent 
Under the context of economic transitions, especially when the 
decentralization is still in process, political capital plays a major role in a firm’s 
strategic choices. But political capital is too complicated and multifaceted to be 
measured in a single variable. Hence I created two variables, while both 
applicable to Chinese listed companies, to try measuring the political capital of 
these companies. One measure is based upon the ownership level, taking into 
consideration of central government ownership, provincial or municipal 
government ownership, local government ownership and non-state ownership. I 
regarded the central government ownership as the one with the highest political 
capital, and the magnitude of political capital is decreasing along the stairs of the 
four ownership level. I created three dummies: PC1, PC2 and PC3. The other 
measure is based upon the accumulative equity share by state: StatePC. 
 For the first measure of political capital, I find that none of the three dummy 
variables is significant in the estimations, whether in the case of total 
diversification, unrelated diversification or related diversification. 
 For the second measure of political capital, StatePC, I find that its coefficients 
are significant but negative in the estimations on total diversification and 
unrelated diversification, but insignificant in the estimations on related 
diversification. To decide whether the linear relationship between StatePC and 
diversification extent is the major relationship, I added the square term of StatePC 
in the estimations. We can see from the tables that the coefficients of StatePC2 are 
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significant and positive. The negative coefficients of StatePC and the positive 
coefficients of StatePC indicate that the relationship between accumulative equity 
share by state and the diversification extent is not linear, but instead a U-shape 
curve. When a company has a low level of state share in its total equity share, it is 
likelihood to show a low level of diversification, but when the state share 
increasing to some point, the extent of diversification of that firm may increase. 
 Having discussed the results from the two measures of political capital, I 
conclude that political capital measured as the ownership level does not affect the 
diversification extent, and that political capital measured as the aggregate equity 
share by state is not linearly related to the diversification, but instead has a 
U-shape relationship with the diversification extent. 
 
6.2.4 Reputation Capital and Diversification Extent 
I argued that the brand name of a company represents the company’s image 
and reputation in the market, and that a famous brand name is an embodiment of a 
firm’s stock of reputation capital and that firm’s capability to access resources and 
markets. I then resorted to the brand name evaluation institutions authorized by 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and created the dummy 
variable Brand. 
 The results from the total diversification and unrelated diversification show 
that brand name is positively and significantly related to the diversification extent. 
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In the case of related diversification, brand name is insignificant. The conclusion 
here is that reputation capital measured in famous brand name is positively related 
to the diversification extent in the former two cases, which supports H4. 
 
6.2.5 Results about the Control Variables 
Across the estimations on three diversification measures, two variables, firm 
total assets and years ever since IPO year, are consistently and significantly 
related to the diversification extent. But the variable measuring IPO age is 
positively associated with total diversification and unrelated diversification, but 
negatively associated with related diversification. Four variables, firm total sales, 
years ever since foundation year, the average ROA in the previous three years, and 
the management efficiency, are consistently and significantly related to the extent 
of total diversification and unrelated diversification, but insignificant in the case 
of related diversification. One other variable, the free cash flow, is insignificant in 
the case of total diversification and unrelated diversification, but significant in the 
case of related diversification.  
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I will integrate the theoretical arguments in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter4 with the empirical results in chapter 6, to further discuss the application 
of institutional theory in the study on diversification. Furthermore, I will try to 
explore alternative explanations both within and beyond the institutional 
arguments, and to identify the weaknesses of and the possible improvement on the 
theoretical development and empirical research design of this study. 
 
7.1 Discussions 
I will arrange the discussions in the order of hypotheses in the following sections. 
The discussions on results of each hypothesis generally include the main 
arguments for that hypothesis, the empirical results, and the further interpretation 
if this hypothesis is supported or alternative explanations if this hypothesis is not 
supported. 
 
7.1.1 Institutional Pressures and Diversification 
In the discussion of influence on diversification strategy by institutional 
pressures in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I argued that SOEs, due to their historical 
importance in the national economy and industrial development, assume a lot 
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more social responsibilities than the non-SOEs do. These social responsibilities 
include, among others, retaining and caring for a certain amount of employment, 
balancing industry distribution across regions and provinces, or participating in 
community services where the enterprise is located (Walder 1994; Li, Li & Tan 
1998). These extra social burdens on SOEs cause the SOEs to seek diversification 
to fulfill those responsibilities, because diversification is able to create 
employment opportunities, to seek new profit point and to beautify balance sheet 
for the entire company, which are actually satisfactory responses to the pressures 
of those social responsibilities. 
SOEs are not only pressed to shoulder social responsibilities, but they also 
benefit from the protection and conveniences from the government during their 
diversification process. The protection and convenience indeed encourage 
diversification even when the diversification fails in the case of many SOEs. 
Hence SOEs have more resources than non-SOEs to carry out diversification 
strategy or to retain a diversified status. 
However, in the economic transitions, SOEs are being assigned more and 
more independences in their strategic decisions. The institutional pressures 
previously from the government are gradually fading out. This is especially true 
for those SOEs that are at the front edge of decentralization process. Chinese 
government has concentrated its major efforts of economic reform on the reform 
of many SOEs and has been trying to put some SOEs into the stock market. This 
group of SOEs acts more like those firms regulated by market principles, and the 
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institutional pressures from the government play a weak role on this group of 
SOEs. Hence the publicly listed SOEs are likely to show diversification patterns 
different from those of the SOEs that are strongly affected by institutional 
pressures. The publicly listed SOEs, compared to other SOEs, pay more attention 
to economic performance rather than political satisfaction, thus these SOEs are 
more cautious in their diversification decisions than other SOEs. This is one 
possible reason that SOEs in the sample of Chinese listed companies do not show 
great extent of diversification. 
 There is another fact that is specific to the economic reform of Chinese SOEs. 
During the preparations for IPO, an SOE is required to restructure itself into a 
limited liability shareholding company (Xiang, 1998). In this process, government 
allows the SOEs to peel off those assets that are non-productive and unprofitable 
and to bring with only those value increasing assets into the shareholding 
company so as to attract public investors in the stock market (Aharony et. al. 2000; 
Tokuchi & Wang 1994). With this permission, a typical SOE usually selects just 
one of its business divisions and pools its value-added assets around this division 
to build a profitable publicly listed company (Tian & Lau 2001). Hence it can be 
the case that an SOE itself is a diversified firm, but its essential assets in the form 
of a publicly listed company, which is also an SOE in our definition, is a focused 
firm. This is one possible reason that the SOEs in the sample of Chinese listed 
companies are associated with low diversification extent. 
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7.1.2 Institutional Capital and Diversification 
Network Breadth: The either insignificant or significant but negative 
coefficients of network breadth indicate that broad network is not necessarily 
good for diversification, while the related diversification is an exceptional case 
because the network breadth is positively and significantly related to the extent of 
related diversification. 
The argument for the positive relationship between network breadth and 
diversification extent is that broad network is supposed to provide much more 
information on diversification opportunities to the strategic decision maker of the 
focal firm. However, the information available through network may not be as 
important as expected. Instead, the role of network is not confined to information 
provision, but beyond, depending on the characteristics of the network 
composition. Specifically, the costs of information seeking and the evaluation of 
the information source by the information seeker may mediate the success rate of 
information seeking through social network (Borgatti & Cross 2003). Furthermore, 
the information benefits from social capital available to the focal firm can be 
differentiated in terms of the information volume, information diversity and 
information richness (Koka & Prescott 2002). 
As in this study I defined the network as the firms that have overlapping top 
10 shareholders with the focal firm, this sort of network has at least two features. 
First, because the firms in the network have at least one shareholder who is also 
the shareholder of the focal firm, these firms are directly or indirectly connected 
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through the shareholder control channel. The broader the network of the focal 
firm, the larger the number of firms controlled or owned by a certain shareholder 
is. Second, following the first feature, the same shareholder can coordinate the 
operations of those firms. For example, the shareholder can, according to its own 
interests such as risk diversion, deploy resources among those firms and suggest 
each firm to focus on just one specific business. In doing so, the shareholder can 
have a diverse portfolio of its own assets, but each part of its assets is consolidated 
by a concentration on one specific business area. Hence if a shareholder has 
equity share in many firms, it is likely that those firms are discouraged to seek 
diversification, especially unrelated diversification, because unrelated 
diversification is more risky on the part of an individual firm than the related 
diversification. Instead, those firms may be encouraged to focus in one business or 
at least related businesses so that they can make best use of their core skills and 
produce high performance (Bettis 1981). 
The above line of reasoning based upon the two features of the network, 
implies the possibility that broad network is associated with low level of unrelated 
diversification, and that narrow network is associated with high level of related 
diversification. Of course this is just one explanation on the positive coefficient of 
network breadth in the case of related diversification but negative coefficient in 
the case of unrelated diversification. There might be alternative explanations that 
can be derived from other characteristics of network. The overall effect of 
network breadth on diversification is undetermined, as the insignificant 
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coefficients imply in the case of total diversification. 
 
Network Diversity: Contrary to network breadth, network diversity is 
significantly related to total diversification and unrelated diversification. In the 
case of related diversification, it is insignificant. The eclectic interpretation is that 
diverse network exerts positive influence on the extent of diversification. 
The argument for the positive relationship between network diversity and 
diversification extent is that a diverse network establishes channels for change of 
various information and business opportunities, because firms are heterogeneous 
in terms of their endowed capabilities and resources (Wernerfelt 1984). However, 
this argument should not be indiscriminately applied to different types of 
diversification, because the information required by different types of 
diversification is not the same, hence the information variety derived from a 
diverse network can be important in one type of diversification but unimportant in 
another type of diversification. In the case of related diversification, where the 
focal firm diversifies into the segments with which it has already been familiar 
with, the information variety can not add much value to its decision making 
process. But in the case of unrelated diversification, where the focal firm steps 
into a brand new business that is beyond its present experience and horizon, the 
firm is supposed to collect enough information on potential opportunities to 
choose an appropriate new business sector and analyze adequate information 
about the newly chosen business sector in terms of the operations and status of the 
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firms already in that sector. Comparatively speaking, unrelated diversification 
requires much more knowledge and information via a diverse network and 
involves more risks than the related diversification. So the diverse network is 
likely to be effective in unrelated diversification, but not in related diversification. 
 
Ownership Level & Aggregate State Share:  
The two measures of political capital produced rather different results. The 
one measured in ownership level is insignificant, which means whether the 
company is owned by central government, provincial government, local 
government or non-government, its diversification strategy is unaffected. But the 
one measured in accumulative equity share by state produces a U-shape 
relationship in the case of total diversification, which means low equity share does 
not lead to diversification but high equity share by state can facilitate 
diversification. Equity share by state is more important to diversification than 
ownership level in this case. 
In developing the two measures in Chapter 5, I argued that the political power 
stairs in the order of ownership level presenting a decreasing order of political 
capital, and that political capital is able to facilitate diversification, so I predicted 
that the firms with central government ownership level possess the greatest 
political capital and show great diversification extent, while the firms with no 
government ownership possess the least political capital and show less 
diversification. Though this argument is reasonable under the idea of decreasing 
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order of political capital, there could be alternative even counteractive 
explanations.  
One such explanation is that during the decentralization process, central 
government gradually decentralizes the previous central controlled rights to the 
lower level governments and highlights the economic relationship (e.g. taxes, fees) 
with the latter. This process motivates the lower level governments to promote 
regional economy by providing generous support to firms they owned. 
Furthermore, the local governments also have the incentives to do so because they 
have to compete with each other to attract mobile factors and to obtain fiscal 
revenues as well as grant from the central government (Qian & Roland 1998). The 
consequence is that many lower level governments owned enterprises can obtain 
comparative resources as those enterprises owned by up level governments. 
Hence, in terms of resource access, the function of political capital embodied in 
different levels of ownership may not be as obvious as expected. Thus the 
contribution of political capital through resource access and government 
protection may not be as big as predicted. 
The political capital measured in the accumulative equity share by state does 
not discriminate the types of state-related shareholders, whether the shareholder is 
a government ministry or a government bureau or an enterprise controlled by state. 
The aggregate equity share therefore takes into consideration of the 
abovementioned consequence of decentralization indeed, because every type of 
ownership is given the same weight in this measure. A firm’s equity share by state 
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is negatively related to its total diversification extent, but this relationship changes 
to the opposite when the equity share arrives at a certain point.  
One implication of this result is that low level of political capital embodied in 
low state equity share is unable to facilitate the firm to access resources that can 
be obtained through other means. During the decentralization process, the 
“invisible hand” or the market competition principle plays an increasingly 
important role in obtaining resources on the part of firms. Many previously 
available non-market competition means like political advantages and 
administrative privileges, though still work to some extent in current China, are 
making much more place for market competition means. A firm’s connections 
with political sectors can bring two consequences: the political capital that are 
beneficial for the firm, and the administrative interference with the firm’s 
operation in the market. If the firm’s political capital is very low, it is very likely 
that the firm cannot gain benefits from the political capital, instead the 
administrative interference can play a dominant role and block the normal 
competition of the firm. Under this context, the low political capital cannot confer 
many advantages to the firms for their diversification.  
On the contrary, if a firm has very strong political capital, it is very likely that 
this firm has strong bargaining power with many political and non-political 
sectors, and that the power embodied in the political capital overwhelms the 
power embodied in market principles. This firm can secure many privileges like 
licenses, waiver of taxes and fees, to participate in the market competition with 
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strong advantages. Under this context, the market principle, though plays 
increasingly important role, still cannot contend with the political advantages. 
This firm is able to access many scarce resources which in turn facilitate its 
diversification, but this only happens when the political advantages preponderate 
over market competition. 
 
Brand Name: Using the evaluation by the institutions authorized by the State 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, I introduced the brand name to measure the 
reputation capital of a firm and found that firms having famous brand show high 
diversification extent. However, the results also show that famous brand name is 
significant in terms of total diversification and unrelated diversification, but not 
related diversification. Two methods have been used to apply the brand name in 
the diversification process: brand name stretch and brand name extension. The 
first one refers to the application of the same brand name in related diversification, 
and the second one refers to the application of the same brand name in unrelated 
diversification (Wood 2000). The results from this study shows that Chinese listed 
companies employ brand name extension a lot, but not brand name stretch. 
 The market competition encouraged by the economy reforms has 
strengthened the awareness of brand name protection by law, both on the part of 
brand name owner and the public. Thus to establish and to maintain a famous 
brand name involves a lot of costs, as the sift mechanism of famous brand name is 
getting rather strict, and the fierce market competition puts a brand name at the 
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danger of substitution. Under this context, an already established famous brand 
name constitutes a valuable asset and competitive advantage for its owner. The 
functions of a famous brand name include, among others, strong customer loyalty, 
quick acknowledgement and trust by business partners, and easy access to other 
businesses. The value of these functions are magnified in the context of transition 
economy, due to the uncertainty occurred in the transition process. The values of a 
famous brand name confer the capabilities for the firm to deal with the uncertainty 
in such kind of institutional environment when it decides to seek diversification, 
especially unrelated diversification. 
 
The different performances of those institutional variables imply that the 
application of institutional argument is itself specific to an institutional context. 
Those variables that are more related to market competition and market principles, 
such as the brand name reputation, seem to behave consistently across different 
economies. However, those variables that are relatively specific to a certain 
institutional context as in the transition economy, such as the political structure 
arrangement, may not follow the general prediction based upon the existent 
research. For example, though a managerial network could be important in 
information exchange and opportunities finding, its role may be subsumed by 
other sorts of network, like the interpersonal exchange without the involvement of 
managerial connection. This is especially true in the case of China because 
personal guanxi still plays a major role in a firm’s strategic decisions, and the 
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guanxi network of a firm is far beyond the managerial network through 
overlapping shareholders. The results also indicate that the institutional capital 
arguments are more consistent with the prediction than the institutional pressures 
arguments. 
 
7.2 Implications and Conclusions  
Drawing upon the institutional perspective and the transition economies of China, 
this study tries to explore the diversification pattern of China’s firms during the 
economic transition. Specifically, I resort to two arguments from institutional 
theory: the legitimacy pressure or the institutional pressures from the outside 
institutional environment, and the institutional capitals possessed by the firms 
themselves. 
 In terms of institutional pressures arguments, I analyzed the changing 
institutional pressures derived from the economic transition from a central 
planning economy to a market-oriented economy and its different effects on SOEs 
and non-SOEs. Then I related this analysis with the diversification extent of 
Chinese firms and predicted that SOEs are likely to be associated with greater 
diversification extent that non-SOEs. The empirical results, however, did not 
provide support for this prediction.  
 In terms of institutional capitals arguments, I focused on the perspective that 
firms embedded in a certain institutional context are able to react proactively 
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towards the pressures form the institutional environment through their 
institutional capabilities embodied in their institutional capitals. I resort to three 
types of capital as the constructs of institutional capital: social capital, political 
capital and reputation capital. Then I designed instruments for the three constructs 
of institutional capital. To carry out empirical tests on these instruments, I further 
differentiated three entropy measures of diversification extent so as to seek richer 
explanations. The empirical test results provide support for some instruments, new 
insights for some other instruments, or no support for some instruments in 
different types of diversification extent measures. 
 Institutional context specific research has been the area within which 
improvements can be done in diversification literatures. The combination of both 
institutional pressures arguments and institutional capitals arguments in one study 
has the advantages to integrate the major perspectives of institutional theory 
literatures, and its application to a diversification study of China’s firms has the 
advantages to investigate the institutional influences on diversification strategy in 
an institutional context of economic transitions. Furthermore, the institutional 
pressures arguments emphasize on the macro or external environment parameters 
of the firm’s operation, while the institutional capitals arguments emphasize on 
the micro or firm level factors. Hence the integration of these two levels of factors 
also has the advantage to provide a full map of a firm’s diversification strategy in 
the theoretical framework of institutional theory. 
 As this study is itself an exploratory study, further research can still be done 
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in the following aspects. 
 Empirically, first, refined measures of three types of institutional capital are 
necessary. As social capital, political capital or reputation capital is multifaceted 
and implicit, it is difficult to measure them in an exact way. For example, I used 
two measures to proxy social capital, network breadth and network diversity, but 
they produced different results. Second, refined constructs of institutional capitals 
are necessary. The political capital, social capital and reputation capital are to 
some extent implicit. Hence it is advantageous if further research can define and 
measure institutional capitals in a more direct way, just as the widely used R&D 
and advertising density to measure a firm’s competitive advantages in the 
perspective of economic efficiency. Thirdly, further study can expand sample 
exclusion if it is focused on Chinese firms. I ran empirical tests on Chinese listed 
companies. Though the listed companies have the advantages of representation 
and data availability, they comprise of only one part of China’s firms. If data is 
available, a more general sample is supposed to offer richer understanding of the 
diversification patterns of China’s firms in the economic transition process. 
 Theoretically, first, one intriguing development on this study is to investigate 
the relationship between institutional pressures and institutional capitals. In this 
study, I resorted to Scott’s three pillars of institutional pressures and discussed 
each pillar’s influence on strategic choices of SOEs and non-SOEs. I also used 
three constructs of institutional capital and created instruments for each construct. 
However, I did not identify the relationship among the three pillars of institutional 
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pressures and the three types of institutional capitals. Second, further study can 
research on the possible moderation effect of ownership identity of a firm on its 
institutional capitals. I studied the effects on diversification of ownership identity 
and institutional capitals respectively. It is possible that SOE and non-SOE, even 
though they have the same stock of institutional capitals, cannot utilize their 
institutional capitals in the same manner due to their different ownership. Thirdly, 
in the hypotheses development section, I argued that the strong institutional 
capitals are able to facilitate a firm to access resources and even to improve firm 
performance. However, it can be the case that the role of a certain type of 
institutional capitals is likely to change under the circumstance of institutional 
transition. It is even possible that the institutional capital facilitating firm 
operation in one circumstance may exert negative influence in another 
circumstance. For example, the political capital grants the firms the convenience 
to obtain scarce resources and other advantages, which are very important when 
market competition is protected or even blocked by regulatory power. However, 
as the economic transition evolves, government itself encourages market 
competition and all firms are supposed to obtain their desired resources through 
market mechanism. The political capital plays no role under this condition. And 
the overdue reliance on political capital may further deteriorate the firm’s abilities 
to cultivate market competitive advantages in the long run. 
 Institutional theory has shown its advantages in study on diversification (e.g. 
Fligstein 1991; Haveman 1993; Peng et al. 2004). Further improvement based 
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upon the abovementioned points, among others, is believed to produce new 
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Chinese firms are constrained by both economic efficiency and institutional 
legitimacy pressures. At the early stage of transition, institutional legitimacy pressure 
plays a larger role in firm strategy choice than at later stages of transition. 
Proposition 2  
 
During the economic transition, compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are more driven by 
social expectation or government regulation than by economic efficiency. Compared 
to SOEs, non-SOEs are more driven by economic efficiency than by social 
expectation or government regulation. 
Proposition 3a 
 
Both SOEs and non-SOEs are constrained by the weak institutional environment in 
the transition economy of China. 
Proposition 3b 
 
Firms with strong institutional capital are able to deal with the weak institutional 
environment better than the firms with weak institutional capital. 






H1: SOEs are likely to show a higher level of diversification than non-SOEs. 
 
H2a: The breadth of a firm’s network is positively related to the extent of its diversification. 
 
H2b: The diversity of a firm’s network is positively related to the extent of its diversification. 
 
H3: The political capital of a firm is positively related to the extent of its diversification. 
 




CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) Industry Classification: 












Agriculture A 19 11 30 2.51% 
Mining B 8 7 15 1.25% 
Manufacturing C 387 320 707 59.08% 
Food & Beverage C0 34 24 58 4.84% 
Textiles & Apparel C1 34 24 58 4.84% 
Timber & Furnishings C2 1 1 2 0.17% 
Paper & Printing C3 15 10 25 2.09% 
Petrochemicals C4 72 64 136 11.36% 
Electronics C5 17 17 34 2.84% 
Metals & Non-metals C6 62 51 113 9.44% 
Machinery C7 109 92 201 16.79% 
Pharmaceuticals C8 43 32 75 6.26% 
Others C9 0 5 5 0.42% 
Utilities D 26 23 49 4.09% 
Construction E 14 7 21 1.75% 
Transportation F 27 19 46 3.85% 
Info. Technology G 37 29 66 5.51% 
Wholesale & Retailing H 53 33 86 7.18% 
Finance I 4 3 7 0.58% 
Real Estate J 25 23 48 4.01% 
Social Service K 17 20 37 3.09 % 
Media L 6 3 9 0.75% 
Conglomerate M 40 36 76 6.35% 
Total  663 534 1197 100% 
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Table 5-2  
Categories of Shareholder 
Code Category of Shareholders 
1 State 
2 Local Government  
3 Government ministry 
4 Government Bureau 
5 Industry Company (Previous government ministry) 
6 State Asset Investment Bureau 
7 State Asset Management Bureau 
8 Infrastructure Construction Company 
9 Market-oriented State Owned Enterprise 
10 Research Institute 
11 Security Company 
12 Investment Fund 
13 Private 
14 Individual 
15 Foreign (HK, Taiwan, other countries) 
16 State Owned Bank 
17 Work Union 
18 Institutional Investor 
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Table 5-3 
Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
 




Total Diversification (TD) RD+UD www.cs.com.cn 
Related Diversification (RD) 
∑Pi*ln(1/Pi): Entropy calculated on 4-digit 
SIC code level 
www.cs.com.cn 
Unrelated Diversification (UD) 
∑Pi*ln(1/Pi): Entropy calculated on 2-digit 
SIC code level 
www.cs.com.cn 
Independent Variables  
 
 
Ownership Identity (S50, S40, 
S30) 
1: SOE; 0: non-SOE  
(50%, 40% and 30% cut-off point) 
DataStream 
Social Capital: 
Network Breadth (NB) 
Number of firms that have overlapping top 
10 shareholders with the focal firm 
DataStream 
Network Diversity (ND) 
(Number of firms in the same industry as 
the focal firm)/(number of all firms that 
have overlapping top 10 shareholders with 
the focal firm) 
DataStream 
Political Capital:   
Categorical Political Capital  
(PC1, PC2, PC3) 
PC1: 1 if central government ownership 
PC2: 1 if provincial or central government 
ownership 
PC3: 1 if local, provincial or central 
government ownership 
0: otherwise for each variable 
DataStream 
Aggregate Political Capital 
(StatePC) 
Aggregate stock share percentage of the 
shareholders related to state 
DataStream 
Reputation Capital: 
                     (Brand) 







Table 5-3 (Cont’) 
Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variables Description Data Source(s) 
Control Variables   
Asset Logarithm of the total assets 
Bloomberg; 
CSMAR 
Sales Logarithm of the total sales 
Bloomberg; 
CSMAR 
DE (total debt)/(total equity) 
Bloomberg; 
CSMAR 




Free cash flow: net income – income taxes – gross 
interest expense on long-term debt – dividends paid 




the average of performance (ROA) in the three years 




The number of years between the year of an 
observation and a firm’s foundation year  
www.sunsc.com.cn 
IPO 
The number of years between the year of an 




Pearson Correlations of the Variables 
  
  PC3 PC2 PC1 S50   S40 S30  StatePC  Brand Asset Sales DE Age IPO ME  FCF  NB   ND ROA 
PC3 1       
PC2 .140** 1      
PC1 .045** .321** 1     
S50 .160** .125** .075** 1    
S40 .185** .133** .070** .699** 1    
S30 .219** .072** .040** .475** .680** 1    
StatePC .206** .115** .072** .816** .806** .740** 1    
Brand .023 .060** .025 .061** .041** .028 .043** 1    
Asset -.011 .132** .092** .104** .076** .060** .143** .124** 1    
Sales .013 .109** .114** .144** .114** .123** .203** .147** .774** 1   
DE -.107** -.010 -.005 -.024 -.033* -.039** -.041** -.004 -.011 -.019 1   
Age -.040** -.103** -.036* -.283** -.210** -.176** -.268** .028 -.030* -.061** .025 1   
IPO -.051** .039** .005 -.255** -.195** -.163** -.237** .014 .112** .010 .049** .514** 1   
ME -.027 .042** .021 -.011 -.002 .028 -.020 -.002 .024 .193** .034* .090** .114** 1   
FCF .001 -.047** -.028 .000 .005 .016 -.004 -.041** -.146** -.048** .003 .054** .058** .036* 1   
NB   .017 .042** .063** -.107** -.028 .029* -.030* .050** .067** .062** -.002 .125** .168** .018 -.029* 1   
ND   -.025 .018 .055** -.006 -.006 .015 .024 .014 .090** .068** .026 .062** .156** .012 .008 .185** 1  
ROA .013 .000 .024 .105** .090** .063** .159** .044** .101** .203** -.075** -.205** -.282** -.243** -.067** -.038* -.026 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6-2 
MLE Random Effects on Total Diversification 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Chibar2 and Prob>=chibar2 refers to the LR test of Sigma_u=0 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Asset 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 
 (6.16) (6.17) (5.90) (6.09) (6.21) (6.16) (5.94) 
Sales -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.028** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.026** 
 (2.64) (2.68) (2.52) (2.58) (2.67) (2.82) (2.33) 
Age 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.02) (1.78) (1.86) (1.87) (2.03) (2.18) (2.07) 
IPO 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (6.15) (5.73) (6.27) (5.78) (6.17) (5.99) (6.07) 
ME -0.033* -0.027 -0.033* -0.025 -0.033* -0.030 -0.036* 
 (1.71) (1.35) (1.69) (1.28) (1.73) (1.53) (1.84) 
FCF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.39) (0.30) (0.34) (0.28) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) 
DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.49) (0.61) (0.39) (0.54) (0.50) (0.53) (0.27) 
ROA -0.247*** -0.264*** -0.236*** -0.267*** -0.246*** -0.261*** -0.240*** 
 (3.44) (3.62) (3.25) (3.66) (3.43) (3.58) (3.30) 
S50  -0.018**      
  (2.17)      
S40   0.010*     
   (1.80)     
S30    -0.033***    
    (3.13)    
Brand     0.021**   
     (2.09)   
PC1      0.016  
      (1.30)  
PC2       -0.007 
       (1.31) 
Con. -0.515*** -0.503*** -0.506*** -0.486*** -0.521*** -0.504*** -0.510*** 
 (5.06)* (4.89) (4.92) (4.72) (5.11) (4.89) (4.99) 
Log 
Likelihood 
1495.6737 1451.7131 1429.0342 1454.2733 1497.85 1459.1855 1454.0191 
LR chi2 219.39 218.87 209.63 224.00 223.75 219.03 213.67 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 1030.71 988.63 962.07 1001.86 1032.07 1000.83 980.25 
Prob>= 
chibar2 
0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6-2 (Cont’) 
MLE Random Effects on Total Diversification 
 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Asset 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 
 (5.96) (6.16) (6.22) (6.25) (6.19) (6.30) (6.28) 
Sales -0.026** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027** -0.027** -0.032*** -0.027** 
 (2.31) (2.65) (2.63) (2.48) (2.41) (2.85) (2.66) 
Age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.003* 0.002 
 (2.07) (2.01) (1.99) (1.76) (1.66) (1.81) (1.63) 
IPO 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (6.09) (6.20) (6.31) (5.87) (6.06) (5.91) (6.06) 
ME -0.035* -0.031 -0.032* -0.032* -0.031 -0.024 -0.029 
 (1.82) (1.63) (1.65) (1.67) (1.62) (1.21) (1.26) 
FCF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.38) (0.41) (0.32) (0.28) (0.16) (0.23) (0.01) 
DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.28) (0.49) (0.57) (0.47) (0.47) (0.71) (0.62) 
ROA -0.239*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.249*** -0.246*** -0.252*** -0.238*** 
 (3.29) (3.38) (3.38) (3.47) (3.41) (3.46) (3.40) 
S50      -0.018**  
      (2.19)  
S40        
        
S30        
        
Brand      0.023** 0.019* 
      (2.26) (1.97) 
PC1      0.019  
      (1.56)  
PC2        
        
PC3 0.014       
 (0.78)       
NB  -0.00049*    -0.00051 -0.00047 
  (1.66)    (1.64) (1.59) 
ND   -0.053**   -0.054** -0.050** 
   (2.46)   (2.49) (2.33) 
StatePC    -0.00039* -0.00063**  -0.00039* 
    (1.90) (2.01)  (1.93) 
StatePC2     0.024*  0.023* 
     (1.72)  (1.65) 
Con. -0.532*** -0.512*** -0.523*** -0.520*** -0.525*** -0.506*** -0.532*** 




1453.4629 1497.0576 1498.6946 1492.6502 1486.4213 1459.6159 1463.084 
LR chi2 212.56 222.16 225.44 223.50 223.75 235.27 240.02 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 982.53 1028.42 1026.80 1022.07 1016.42 980.82 984.43 
Prob>= 
chibar2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Chibar2 and Prob>=chibar2 refers to the LR test of Sigma_u=0 
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Table 6-3 
MLE Random Effects on Unrelated Diversification 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Asset 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 
 (5.51) (5.52) (5.22) (5.44) (5.55) (5.51) (5.27) 
Sales -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.025** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.023** 
 (2.70) (2.74) (2.56) (2.65) (2.73) (2.87) (2.37) 
age 0.003** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.13) (1.82) (1.98) (1.96) (2.14) (2.26) (2.17) 
IPO 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013 0.013 0.013*** 
 (6.88) (6.47) (7.00) (6.54) (6.90)*** (6.76)*** (6.83) 
ME -0.036** -0.030* -0.036** -0.029* -0.036** -0.033* -0.038** 
 (2.10) (1.73) (2.09) (1.66) (2.12) (1.91) (2.22) 
FCF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.79) (0.70) (0.82) (0.68) (0.76) (0.78) (0.83) 
de 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.17) 
ROA -0.224*** -0.240*** -0.216*** -0.242*** -0.224*** -0.238*** -0.214*** 
 (3.55) (3.73) (3.37) (3.77) (3.54) (3.70) (3.35) 
S50  -0.018**      
  (2.54)      
S40   0.008*     
   (1.67)     
S30    -0.030***    
    (3.24)    
Brand     0.017*   
     (1.88)   
PC1      0.010  
      (0.96)  
PC2       -0.005 
       (1.02) 
Con. -0.366*** -0.352*** -0.354*** -0.337*** -0.370*** -0.355*** -0.360*** 
 (4.08) (3.89) (3.89) (3.71) (4.12) (3.91) (4.00) 
Log 
Likelihood 
2062.7654 2008.813 1979.3257 2010.8205 2064.5327 2018.4572 2013.1679 
LR chi2 234.23 236.26 224.36 240.27 237.76 234.08 226.99 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 1051.16 1006.69 988.74 1021.23 1052.09 1022.50 994.47 
Prob>= 
chibar2 
0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Chibar2 and Prob>=chibar2 refers to the LR test of Sigma_u=0 
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Table 6-3 (Cont’) 
MLE Random Effects on Unrelated Diversification 
 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Asset 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 
 (5.28) (5.51) (5.58) (5.60) (5.54) (5.67) (5.64) 
Sales -0.023** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.024** -0.029*** -0.024** 
 (2.35) (2.72) (2.69) (2.51) (2.44) (2.90) (2.49) 
age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (2.17) (2.12) (2.09) (1.82) (1.73) (1.84) (1.70) 
IPO 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (6.84) (6.95) (7.09) (6.56) (6.72) (6.72) (7.00) 
ME -0.038** -0.034** -0.034** -0.035** -0.034** -0.027 -0.031* 
 (2.20) (1.99) (2.02) (2.05) (2.00) (1.54) (1.82) 
FCF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.84) (0.83) (0.71) (0.68) (0.62) (0.62) (0.55) 
de -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.15) (0.00) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.20) (0.08) 
ROA -0.214*** -0.220*** -0.220*** -0.226*** -0.223*** -0.228*** -0.214*** 
 (3.34) (3.48) (3.48) (3.58) (3.51) (3.55) (3.38) 
S50      -0.018**  
      (2.53)  
S40        
        
S30        
        
Brand      0.018** 0.015* 
      (2.07) (1.66) 
PC1      0.014  
      (1.28)  
PC2        
        
PC3 0.011       
 (0.73)       
NB  -0.001**    -0.001** -0.001** 
  (2.27)    (2.21) (2.21) 
ND   -0.059***   -0.059*** -0.057*** 
   (3.13)   (3.10) (3.00) 
StatePC    -0.00039** -0.000428**  -0.00061** 
    (2.21) (2.30)  (2.19) 
StatePC2     0.014  0.013 
     (1.14)  (1.03) 
Con. -0.378*** -0.362*** -0.374*** -0.368*** -0.372*** -0.356*** -0.379*** 




2012.91 2065.3399 2067.6477 2059.4962 2051.5872 2018.8181 2024.681 
LR chi2 226.48 239.38 243.99 239.35 239.20 256.86 262.46 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 996.24 1049.58 1047.79 1041.55 1038.25 1000.60 1008.22 
Prob>= 
chibar2 
0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Chibar2 and Prob>=chibar2 refers to the LR test of Sigma_u=0 
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Table 6-4 
MLE Random Effects on Related Diversification 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Asset 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (4.08) (3.99) (4.04) (4.00) (4.10) (4.05) (4.11) 
Sales -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.91) (0.94) (0.88) (0.83) (0.92) (0.98) (0.91) 
age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.33) (0.63) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33) (0.44) (0.35) 
IPO -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (2.78) (2.72) (2.69) (2.90) (2.76) (2.88) (2.84) 
ME 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 (1.32) (1.26) (1.30) (1.30) (1.32) (1.39) (1.25) 
FCF 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.65) (2.55) (2.65) (2.64) (2.67) (2.62) (2.78) 
de 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.11) (1.22) (1.13) (1.20) (1.12) (1.21) (1.12) 
ROA -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.024 -0.030 
 (0.78) (0.91) (0.78) (0.90) (0.79) (0.74) (0.92) 
S50  0.006      
  (1.63)      
S40   0.002     
   (0.62)     
S30    -0.001    
    (0.23)    
Brand     0.004   
     (0.90)   
PC1      0.007  
      (1.26)  
PC2       -0.003 
       (1.00) 
Con. -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.216*** -0.211*** -0.213*** -0.209*** -0.215*** 
 (4.47) (4.39) (4.49) (4.38) (4.48) (4.36) (4.48) 
Log 
Likelihood 
3109.5366 3048.1952 2981.1689 4036.8949 3109.9403 3073.5846 3031.426 
LR chi2 35.14 38.92 36.66 36.32 36.95 37.61 38.23 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 483.77 487.47 432.07 485.78 483.50 480.73 471.84 
Prob>=chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Chibar2 and Prob>=chibar2 refers to the LR test of Sigma_u=0 
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Table 6-4 (Cont’) 
MLE Random Effects on Related Diversification 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Asset 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (4.12) (4.11) (4.03) (4.08) (4.00) (3.99) (3.95) (4.00) 
Sales -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.90) (0.92) (0.90) (0.97) (0.99) (1.00) (1.05) (1.00) 
age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.35) (0.46) (0.41) (0.64) (0.50) (0.40) 
IPO -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** 
 (2.78) (2.85) (2.87) (2.67) (2.42) (2.86) (2.65) (2.54) 
ME 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (1.26) (1.24) (1.28) (1.29) (1.28) (1.17) (1.22) (1.15) 
FCF 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (2.78) (2.65) (2.53) (2.59) (2.64) (2.45) (2.52) (2.56) 
de 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.14) (1.12) (1.06) (1.13) (1.15) (1.17) (1.19) (1.10) 
ROA -0.029 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.91) (0.81) (0.78) (0.77) (0.83) (0.89) (0.83) (0.88) 
S50      0.006   
      (1.53)   
S40         
         
S30         
         
Brand      0.004 0.004 0.004 
      (0.83) (0.84) (0.84) 
PC1      0.006 0.007  
      (1.11) (1.13)  
PC2         
         
PC3 0.005        
 (0.53)        
NB  0.00029*    0.00028* 0.00031* 0.00030* 
  (1.84)    (1.74) (1.88) (1.86) 
ND   0.015   0.013 0.014 0.014 
   (1.29)   (1.12) (1.18) (1.22) 
StatePC    0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
    (0.84) (0.80)  (0.76) (0.75) 
StatePC2     0.014**  0.014* 0.015** 
     (2.00)  (1.95) (2.09) 
Con. -0.222*** -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.212*** 
 (4.53) (4.51) (4.40) (4.49) (4.45) (4.36) (4.34) (4.44) 
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Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




3031.0666 3111.2254 3110.3738 3108.2799 3085.0822 3051.3969 3051.7266 3087.9771 
LR chi2 37.51 39.52 37.82 36.81 40.37 45.33 47.04 46.16 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chibar2 473.95 485.63 484.15 483.32 476.50 486.09 476.06 478.66 
Prob>= 
chibar2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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APPENDIX B: Entropy Measure of Diversification1 
 
Consider a firm operating in N industry segments. The entropy measure of 
total diversification TD is defined as follows. 
Let Pi be the share of the ith segment in the total sales of the firm. Then 
TD=∑Pi*ln(1/Pi) 
The above expression is a weighted average of the shares of the segments, the 
weight for each segment being the logarithm of the inverse of its share. The 
measure, thus, takes into consideration two elements of diversification: (1) the 
number of segments in which a firm operates, and (2) the relative importance of 
each of the segments in the total sales. 
An attractive feature of the entropy measures is that it recognizes a third 
dimension of diversity, namely the degree of relatedness among the various 
segments in which a firm operates. To see this, let us define an industry group as a 
set of related segments. The segments within an industry group are expected to be 
more related to one another than segments across group. Let the N industry 
segments of the firm aggregate into M industry groups, (N>=M). 
Let RDj be defined as the related diversification arising out of operating in 
several segments within an industry group j. Following the definition of the 
entropy measure, RDj can be written as 
RDj=∑Pi*ln(1/Pji) 
where Pji is defined as the share of the segment i of group j in the total sales of the 
                                                        
1 This calculation is abstracted from Palepu (1985). 
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group. 
Since our firm operates in several industry groups, its total related 
diversification RD is a function of RDj, j=1, …, M. It is defined as 
RD=∑DRjPj 
where Pj is the share of the jth group shares in the total sales of the firm. Note that 
RD is the weighted average of the related diversification within all the M groups. 
Each group gets a weightage equal to its share, a measure of its importance in the 
total operations of the firm. 
Let UD be unrelated diversification. This arises out of operating across 
several industry groups. Consistent with the definition of TD, UD is defined as 
UD=∑Pj*ln(1/Pj) 
which is the weighted average of all the group shares. 
It can be shown that, under the above definitions, the sum of the related and 






  =∑Pj*[∑Pjiln(1/Pji)+ln(1/Pj) 
  =∑Pj*[∑(Pi/Pj]ln(Pj/Pi)+ln(1/Pj) 
  =∑[∑Pi*ln(1/Pi)+ln(Pj)+ln(1/Pj)] 
  =∑∑Pi*ln(1/Pi) 
  =TD 
